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To combat the widespread affliction of corporate crime, a more effective corporate liability 
framework for optimal crime deterrence is required. At the core of this framework lies the 
trade-off between the social benefits of optimal crime deterrence on one side, and the societal 
harm from the fines that are sufficiently harsh to deter crime, which can in turn lead to 
corporate bankruptcy on the other.  In this thesis, I evaluate whether the harshest corporate 
fines, the benchmark penalties, can be a relevant and appropriate tool in an ensemble of 50 
completed enforcement cases. The relevance of this penalty is defined from the crime 
deterrence perspective, according to the extent with which firms collaborate with enforcement 
agencies, in terms of self-reporting their crimes and fully cooperating with the authorities. In 
contrast, the appropriateness of the penalty is defined from the government's perspective, 
according to the collateral consequences of this penalty on different stakeholder groups and 
how the government regards them.  
I find that the benchmark penalty could have been relevant in 16 cases from a deterrence 
standpoint, out of 38 with sufficient data. From these 16 cases, in no more than three cases 
would governments find the enforcement of the benchmark penalty, and its associated risk of 
corporate bankruptcy, appropriate according to the damage it creates for the group they put 
the highest degree of emphasis on. These findings highlight the burden that the current status 
quo of corporate liability presents for crime deterrence, and demonstrate the unfeasibility of 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate crime is a widespread affliction (Nelson, 2017), to the point that it substantially 
affects the global economy substantially (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020). To combat this 
ailment and avoid the enormous costs of corporate crime on society, deterrence should be a 
priority (Arlen, 2020). Deterrence is the discouragement of committing crimes, particularly 
through the fear of punishment, and the most effective tool to deter corporate crime is by 
imposing corporate liability.  
Corporate liability has emerged through an expansion of corporate regulations in the 20th 
century. Especially, international collaborations like the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-
Bribery Convention have aided to form legislation for punishing corporate crime (Auriol, 
Hjelmeng, & Søreide, forthcoming). Many countries enforce corporate liability under criminal 
law, while others enforce it under civil law. Nevertheless, in practice, corporations can be 
sanctioned in similar ways independently from the type of enforcement (Auriol et al., 
forthcoming). Moreover, many countries use similar, albeit varying, criteria for the 
requirements of corporate liability, such as the connection between the crime and the firm, and 
also the application of the identification theory1 (OECD, 2016; Pieth, Low, & Cullen, 2007). 
Still, to this day, the corporate sanctions in place in existing corporate liability frameworks 
have been insufficient in providing the necessary deterrence levels. Corporate fines are too 
low, and enforcement agencies too lenient on corporations to create substantial fear of 
punishments (Coffee, 1981; Hulpke, 2017; Kaplow, 1989; Thomas, 2017). As a result, 
corporations can have an increased perception of fines as the inherent “cost of doing 
business”(Thomas, 2017). In this thesis, I present the corporate liability framework that is 
required for optimal crime deterrence. This framework revolves around a twofold incentive: 
the certainty of reduced sanctions for complying corporations, and, more importantly, the risk 
of severe sanctions for their non-complying counterparts. 
However, the severe sanctions required for optimal crime deterrence introduce a new risk: 
sanction-induced bankruptcy. With increasing fines, corporations become less able to bear the 
 
1 The Identification theory determines that a person of leading position must have been involved in the crime to impose 
corporate liability. 
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financial burden of their penalties, eventually risking going bankrupt. This implies that, in 
some cases, these harsher penalties required to effectively deter corporate crime become a de 
facto Corporate Death Penalty (CDP). The CDP, established generally as “any sanction that 
either directly or indirectly threatens the ongoing viability of the corporation” (Padfield, 2018), 
exists in many forms, such as by revoking a corporate charter (Grossman, 2015; Linzey, 1995), 
or indirectly by enforcing a criminal conviction2 (Hamdani & Klement, 2007). Here, I will 
refer solely to the CDP that results as a consequence of harsh fines (Coffee, 1981; Thomas, 
2017). In this regard, the CDP considered in this thesis is not the purpose of the punishment 
but rather its side effect. This stands in contrast to other forms of the CDP, which focus on the 
death of the corporation as their primary goal.  
The CDP, by being the most severe penalty available for enforcement agencies, can 
introduce  a whole new scale of crime deterrence (Hulpke, 2017; Wray & Hur, 2006) and harsh 
penalties maximize incentivized compliance for legal and ethical standards. However, these 
harsher penalties, and in particular those resulting in the CDP, can lead to severe collateral 
consequences for different stakeholder groups. Employees could lose their employment, and 
investors their investment. Consumers could be harmed by decreasing market competition; 
and the remaining industry, although may benefit from the removal of a competitor, could also 
suffer reputational damages. These risks imply that the CDP creates an inherit trade-off, 
between the societal benefit of optimal deterrence on one side, and the societal harm of a firm's 
bankruptcy on the other. This might be the very reason why corporate liability remains to this 
day consistently underenforced3. 
In this thesis, I investigate whether enforcing the highest corporate sanctions, with their 
associated risk of corporate bankruptcy and societal damage, is a viable tool for crime 
deterrence for enforcement agencies and governments. Thus, I address the following 
questions: 
 
2 A conviction of guilt can create further implications for the firm. For example, the United States security and exchange 
commission does not allow convicted felons to operate as auditors. This proved to be fatal for the accounting firm Arthur 
Andersen, who went out of business in 2001 after a conviction by the justice department.   
3 For example, the EU commission reserves the right to readjust the sanction downwards if the ongoing viability of a firm is 
threatened. See: EU (2006).Other reasons could be technical impediments and political incentives. See: Soreide (2018) 
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1. Under which conditions could enforcement agencies apply the harshest sanctions for 
optimal crime deterrence, risking corporate bankruptcy? 
2. Which circumstances lead to the most damaging collateral consequences of CDP for 
different stakeholders? 
3. Considering these circumstantial consequences, when would governments find risking the 
CDP appropriate? 
This thesis is structured as follows: in Section II, I present the theory on an optimal corporate 
liability framework for crime deterrence. This framework establishes that harsh sanctions can 
be applied, from a deterrence standpoint, if a corporation has (1) not self-reported the crime, 
(2) not fully cooperated with enforcement agencies, and (3) the crime was committed 
systematically and not by one rogue employee.  
In Section III, I analyze the circumstances that lead to the most damaging consequences of the 
CDP. I argue that, compared to other stakeholder groups, the CDP consequences for 
consumers and producers are most decisive in determining the viability of the CDP. For these 
two groups, I find the two most critical variables for determining potential effects: market 
concentration and industry leverage. A CDP in a concentrated market can result in increased 
prices, which is harmful for consumers while increasing profit margins for the remaining 
producers in the industry. In contrast, industry leverage levels can determine to which extent 
reputational damages spread to the remaining producers after a bankruptcy. 
In Section IV, I determine whether the highest fines, implying potential CDP, could be applied 
from a deterrence standpoint on a dataset provided by Auriol et al. (forthcoming). This data 
sample contains 50 completed enforcement cases from five different countries from which I 
use 38 for my analysis. In cases in which the CDP is applicable, I analyze to which extent 
consumers and producers are affected by its consequences. 
In Section V, I discuss how this framework could be expanded and elaborate on interesting 
aspects for future research and potential limitations of this study. Furthermore, I develop an 
additional test to determine whether governments would find risking the CDP appropriate 
based on which stakeholder groups are most affected, and whether the governments favor the 
group.  
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In Section VI I summarize the main findings of my study and elaborate on the main 
conclusions and implications that can be drawn from them. 
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2. Optimal Framework for Crime Deterrence 
Ultimately, the goal of corporate liability is to deter crime for the wellbeing of society. 
However, to this day, the size of monetary penalties is too modest to create optimal deterrence. 
While harsh sanctions can increase deterrence, they can also induce the CDP, which can have 
a detrimental effect on societal wellbeing. A tradeoff is created, with maximum deterrence on 
the one hand and consequences for society through corporate bankruptcy on the 
other. Whether a harsh fine, that inherits the risk of sanction-induced bankruptcy, is a penalty 
to enforce for an instance of corporate crime thus hinges on an assessment of the relevant 
conditions of a respective case. 
In this section, I introduce an optimal corporate liability framework for crime deterrence and 
analyze why harsh penalties, even when they risk corporate bankruptcy, are needed to create 
maximum deterrence. In addition, this framework provides the necessary conditions to enforce 
harsh penalties, which could risk the CDP. 
2.1 Holding Corporations Liable 
Corporate liability, implying that corporations can and must be held accountable for the 
criminal acts of their employees, is historically debated (Lederman, 1985). Criminal acts can 
inherently be committed only by individuals, and not by corporations (Arlen, 2012). In a world 
with only individual liability, only the individuals that commit crimes would be punished; 
whereas the corporations that benefited from these crimes remain exempt. On the other hand, 
the potential punishment that corporations could endure for the actions of their employees 
could have tremendous implications by being so severe that it threatens corporate bankruptcy, 
which might put undesirable harm on third parties. Individual liability relies on sanctions that 
are only imposed on the culpable individuals, not the corporations itself, and has one main 
goal: to deter potential violators from committing a crime (Arlen, 2012). Similarly, corporate 
liability should also be understood as a tool to deter crime, and not as tool for retribution4 
(Arlen, 2020).  
 
4 Arlen (2020) finds that deterrence should be the focus, since corporate crime is severely damaging to consumers and society 
and since purely retributive actions would ultimately fall on the shareholders, who have little impact on corporate crime 
prevention when the company is not closely-held. 
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Corporate liability is not only a suitable tool for crime deterrence, it is also extremely effective 
(Arlen, 1994, 2012; Arlen & Kraakman, 1997). The way that companies can control their 
employees (Oded, 2010; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, 1989), while having a clear overview of the 
firm's structure and operations implies that prevention and policing measures for crime 
deterrence enforced in house by the company are not only effective, but also always more 
efficient than those enforced by external governmental agencies (Arlen & Kraakman, 1997). 
2.2 Prevention and Policing 
Prevention and policing measures help corporations’ control whether or not their employees 
find crime attractive and easy to get away with. Prevention measures decrease the benefits that 
employees receive from crime and also increase the costs associated with committing it (Arlen, 
2012; Kornhauser, 1982). On the other hand, the right policing measures in place increase the 
probability of criminal acts being punished (Arlen & Kraakman, 1997). 
Companies can prevent crime by limiting the weight that employee performance has on 
employee income. Employees often do not benefit from their crimes directly, but rather 
indirectly as their crimes increase a firm’s revenue and thus qualify them for compensation 
and promotion bonuses. Thus, by reducing these performance-based bonuses and benefits, the 
firm makes committing crimes for improved performance less attractive (Arlen, 2012; Arlen 
& Kraakman, 1997). 
In addition to reducing the indirect performance-related benefits, other preventive measures 
the firm can take include increasing the cost of committing crimes, by implementing an 
aggressive legal compliant environment. This could be achieved by establishing and 
upkeeping corporate ethical standards that put potential violators under aggravated 
moral burdens, and by introducing internal reporting systems that improve the chance of 
detection by whistleblowers (Arlen, 2012; Conley & O'Barr, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2005). 
In contrast, companies can deter crime by ensuring that when crimes are committed, they are 
exposed and punished. The most effective policing measures for exposing crimes include 
closely monitoring employee activity and operations, exhaustive internal investigations, self-
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reporting crimes to local authorities, and fully cooperating with the enforcement agencies5 
(Arlen, 1994, 2012; Arlen & Kraakman, 1997).  
These policing actions are especially efficient when carried out by the company itself, 
compared to other external institutions (Arlen & Kraakman, 1997). Enforcement agencies 
have more difficulties understanding all the details of a company’s operations and lack the 
tools to best monitor and investigate the firm’s employees. In contrast, the firm can evaluate its 
behavior more efficiently and recognize potential misconduct more easily, both in local 
offices, as well as in international jurisdictions often non-accessible for enforcement agencies. 
A firm can also procure and evaluate potential evidence that is crucial for the investigation of 
a crime with much reduced associated burdens and procedural costs. Similarly, self-reporting 
alleviates the costs associated with crime investigation substantially for enforcement 
agencies6; while full cooperation not only decreases enforcement expenses but also helps 
agencies identify responsible individuals and put them to justice (Arlen, 2012, 2020). 
A separate aspect to consider regarding optimal implementation of policing measures is the 
tradeoff between broad liability and a pervasiveness standard. Under broad liability the firm 
can be held liable for crimes committed by their entire workforce, and even if it is committed 
just by a single employee. This incentivizes corporations to deter crime by their entire 
workforce (Arlen, 2020). On the other hand, a pervasiveness standard would only put harsh 
corporate sanctions on crimes that have been committed by more than one rogue employee. 
Hamdani and Klement (2007) find that corporations can invest much in policing crime, but 
perfect deterrence is hard to reach. If even one oversight in the system, in the form of a crime 
by a single employee, could result in severe corporate penalties, monitoring incentives could 
be reduced as complete certainty of avoiding corporate liability is not achievable.  By allowing 
harsh systematic sanctions only for systematic crimes, firms could be incentivized to at least 
diligently deter systematic criminality.  
In terms of policing measures, monitoring and investigative efforts are helpful tools for crime 
deterrence that come at a relatively low risk for most companies. On the other hand, self-
 
5 Self-reporting a crime is disclosing the misconduct to authorities, without knowing if the government is already investigating 
them. Full cooperation means that after the crime was revealed, the corporation provides additional evidence about the scope 
of the misconduct and the part natural persons have played in it. See: Arlen (2020) 
6 For more literature on the benefits of self-reporting in individual crimes see: Kaplow and Shavell (1994)  
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reporting and full cooperation occur when crimes have been actually committed, and the risk 
of serious repercussions and liability exist. Self-reporting and full cooperation involve the 
active corporate engagement that is vital for successful crime prosecution. 
Although establishing these prevention and policing measures is cheaper and more efficient 
for companies than for enforcement agencies, they do not come free of costs. Prevention 
policies as well as monitoring and investigating efforts involve implementation expenses for 
companies, whereas self-reporting and full cooperation involve not only these expenses, but 
also potentially much larger liability costs for non-law-abiding companies. So, the question 
remains: why should companies implement and maintain these efforts? 
The main argument defending that these efforts are not required nor justifiable is that 
individual liability may be sufficient for maximum crime deterrence. To evaluate whether this 
statement is true, Arlen (2012) uses a simple theoretical model framework, in which it is 
assumed that individuals are not restricted by wealth and all parties have prefect access to 
information7. In this simplified framework, Arlen (2012) finds that individual liability alone 
is sufficient for optimal crime deterrence. 
However, the strict assumptions in this model are neither reasonable nor plausible in a real-
world setting. Real-world individuals do not have perfect access to information, but more 
importantly, they are strongly limited by wealth. This means that the fines required to pay for 
corporate crime, where individuals can use a corporation’s influence to create long-lasting and 
wide-reaching damage, are unpayable for real-world individuals8 (Arlen, 2012; Polinsky & 
Shavell, 1993).  
Apart from wealth constrictions, individual liability also suffers practical application 
obstacles. As the goal of a law process should be to establish the material truth, individual 
liability hinges on two criteria: identifying the responsible actors and proving guilt beyond 
 
7 Arlen (2012) finds that, in this model, the state can optimally deter crime using either individual liability, by applying a 
sanction that equals the harm caused, or using corporate liability, by inducing firms to put sanctions on employees who 
committed a crime. The combination of both liability regimes is not advised since the state can already optimally deter through 
individual liability alone. Thus, to deter corporate crimes, individual liability with monetary sanctions would be sufficient. 
See also: Polinsky and Shavell (1993) 
8 A potential alternative to monetary sanctions in the form of imprisonment is not regarded as a viable substitution. A prison 
sentencing often comes with limitations in form of age and health conditions. In addition, if individuals go to prison for a 
lengthy amount of time for their violations, it creates a problem in the form of marginal deterrence, since there is not a harsher 
punishment available for a harsher violation. See: Arlen (2012) 
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reasonable doubt (Rui & Soreide, 2018). However, identifying the person responsible for a 
crime can be difficult due to the complexity of the organization, and the risk of a punishing a 
scapegoat, who would take all the blame, while other responsible employees can avoid 
liability, is prevalent (Garrett, 2015; Søreide, 2016). Proving the guilt of individuals involves 
obstacles, as crimes are often masqueraded as normal business activity which further impedes 
the collection of evidence. As a result, establishing the relation of the suspect and the criminal 
intent remains difficult, and employees and senior management are often not prosecuted 
(Søreide & Makinwa, 2020).   
Thus, under real-world conditions, individual liability is insufficient to optimally deter 
corporate crime alone, and governments would need to implement further crime deterrence 
mechanisms. The most cost-effective crime deterrence mechanisms are corporate prevention 
and policing measures (Arlen, 2012) and the most efficient way of inducing these measures is 
corporate liability. Nevertheless, it remains critical that individual liability is also 
implemented. Without putting culpable employees to justice, corporate liability would only 
threaten corporations, while individuals feel no consequences of committing crimes. A joint 
liability regime, of individual liability that puts real costs on individuals, and corporate liability 
that incentivizes effective deterrence measures is optimal (Arlen, 2012).  
2.3 Inducing Corporate Compliance 
So far, we have established that prevention and policing measures are an effective tool for 
crime deterrence, albeit a costly one for corporations. However, the most efficient strategies 
for incentivizing corporations to actually implement these measures remain to be discussed. 
Why would corporations decide to implement expensive prevention and monitoring measures? 
And more importantly, why would corporations decide to facilitate the efforts of external 
enforcement agencies, thereby increasing their own liability risks, by self-reporting and full 
cooperation? 
The answer to these questions can be summarized in one simple argument: well-defined 
corporate liability policies that rely on harsh sanctions for non-complying companies and 
sentencing mitigation for complying companies. These policies should revolve around a duty-
based liability regime where final penalties depend on the actions that companies take to 
prevent or reveal corporate crime (Søreide, 2016). 
 16
If a corporation has complied diligently – by monitoring, investigating, self-reporting, and 
fully cooperating – then mitigating factors could be considered for its potential sentencing. On 
the other hand, if a corporation has not taken any measures to deter crime, then any potential 
sentencing should involve the harshest possible sanctions. However, compliance actions, like 
self-reporting and full cooperation, require the active corporate engagement that is vital for 
successful crime prosecution, while entailing a high level of corporate liability risk for the 
corporations. 
Self-reports reveal unknown crime to enforcement agencies; crimes which could otherwise be 
never detected. Full cooperation provides crucial evidence for prosecuting and sentencing 
liable firms and culpable individuals. However, companies cannot be expected to adopt one, 
let alone both, of these incriminating measures without the certainty that their situation would 
improve by doing so. This could be achieved with a ladder-like penalty system where each 
individual action mitigates the sanction. A compliant company would then receive the lowest 
penalty only if it both self-reported and fully cooperated (Arlen, 2012). 
On the other hand, non-compliant companies that have neither self-reported nor cooperated 
should receive sanctions many times higher than what they benefited from their crimes. I will 
refer to this maximum sanction for non-complying companies as the benchmark penalty.  By 
making the benchmark penalty also dependent on probability of detection9 and the generated 
harm10 (Becker, 1968), fines could become more and more extreme and create severe financial 
instability in corporations, which could induce corporate bankruptcy and make the benchmark 
penalty a de facto CDP. Thus, by threatening the benchmark penalty, firms are motivated to 
obtain the lower sanctions through self-reporting and fully cooperating. However, the certainty 
of enforcement is critical in achieving the desired deterrence. Otherwise, enforcement agencies 
could risk upholding a facade of threats, without any actions to support them. 
 
9 For further classical literature on the effect of the probability of detection see Polinsky and Shavell (1979) 
10Becker (1968) proposes that the optimal fine should be the harm to third parties, divided by the probability of detection. 
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Moreover, even the benchmark penalty will have no deterrence effect11, if governments are 
not regularly detecting unreported crime. Without a reliable rate of detection, all penal threats 
become meaningless, as corporations face no risk of getting caught and receive any sanctions. 
2.4 Optimal Deterrence in Practice 
In practice, governments have prominently introduced non-trial resolutions (NTR) as a tool to 
settle corporate crime cases not in court but in negotiations beforehand, which often allows 
corporations to avoid harsh sanctions (OECD, 2019b). 
NTR evolved in the early 2000s, as governments wanted to combine enforcement with 
compliance and lower sanctions for cooperative corporations (Søreide & Makinwa, 2020). 
Governments often approve of NTR, as they are a cost efficient alternative to court 
proceedings and also increases the pace of enforcement processes, which results in an increase 
the total number of enforcement actions (Søreide & Makinwa, 2020). However, there are 
immense difference between jurisdiction concerning the use of NTR, for example in 
prosecutorial discretions and guidelines. These differences create challenges for enforcement 
agencies, who more and more rely on international collaborations for efficient enforcement, 
as the different jurisdictional approached can clash in the collaboration. Moreover, 
corporations that operate internationally face uncertainty about their exposure to double 
jeopardy12. Settlements in one country can expose corporations to claims from different 
jurisdictions, especially when a NTR misses punitive functions that other governments want 
to enforce. This could create an extreme situation for corporations, where they are confronted 
by more and more countries and have increasing expenses (Søreide & Makinwa, 2020). As a 
result, firms might be motivated to rather hide their crimes instead of risking international 
exposure through self-reporting and the revealing it.  
 
11 In addition, Auriol and Søreide (2017) find that harsh penalties only create deterrence if firms put value on future contracts 
and operations. Moreover, they find that harsh penalties, like debarment or the CDP, can create serious consequences in 
concentrated markets (see section 3.3) which restricts their application. However, firms in concentrated markets put the 
highest value on future business. This insight creates a dilemma for extreme penalties, as they seem to have the highest effect 
in markets where they cannot be applied. 
12 Double jeopardy is the punishment of a person/corporation twice for the same offence. 
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Due to the lack of proper guidelines and requirements, some enforcement agencies have 
flexibility in their decision making. Although this allows authorities to assess settlements on 
a case-by-case basis, it also allows firms to negotiate and benefit from this flexibility. Through 
this negotiation, corporations could receive reduced sanctions, while not fully complying in 
line with the framework of optimal deterrence. If corporations that have not self-reported are 
still allowed to enter NTR, it demotivates self-reporting and would make the threat of the 
benchmark penalty and the CDP meaningless, as firms could always try to receive settlements 
that refrain from enforcing harsh sanctions.  
An important type of NTR is the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA)13(Arlen, 2020). 
Through a DPA, enforcement agencies put criminal charges and sanctions on corporations, 
however, the liable firm avoids trial and a sentencing. The corporation benefits as the fines are 
generally lowered and it can evade further fallout through a conviction of guilt. Arlen (2020) 
finds that the offering of a DPA should be subjected to the same framework that we have 
discussed in this section (Arlen, 2020): self-reporting and full cooperation. However, that is 
often not the case in the real world. For example, France has introduced legislation that allows 
corporations to enter into a Judicial Public Interest Agreements14 (CJIP), a deal similar to a 
DPA. The access to a CJIP is not at all conditioned to self-reported acts and full cooperation 
but is rather used when it is for the “public interest”15. As a result, prevention and policing 
measures are not optimally incentivized which leads to limited deterrence (Arlen, 2020). 
Although international collaboration with the goal to combat corporate crime have been 
introduced over time16, not only France, but most governments have failed so far to install the 
necessary framework to optimally deter corporate crime. Moreover, reliable and 
internationally consistent guidelines for the use of NTR are still missing. These oversights 
contribute to the suboptimal deterrence levels that persist to this day (Arlen, 2020).  
 
13  Other NTR are the guilty plea, which simulates a criminal conviction, and non-prosecution agreements, which do not incur 
criminal charges, if the corporation fulfills their part of a bargain. See Arlen (2020) 
14 See article 22 Sapin II 
15 Arlen (2020) mentions that there is no indication yet on what criteria categorizes a CJIP for the public interest. For further 
literature (in French) see d’Ambrosio (2019). 
16  Like the 1994 Agreement to take measures to combat and deter bribery of foreign public officials, the 1996 Accord to ban 
tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials or the 1997 OECD Anti Bribery Convention. For further details see Pieth (1997). 
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2.5 Deterrence-based Variables 
In this section, I present an incentive-based corporate liability framework for optimal crime 
deterrence. These incentives are twofold: mitigating sanctions for complying corporations and 
enforcing harsh penalties for corporations that did not self-report or fully cooperate. 
The benchmark penalties for non-compliant firms, can be so severe that they threaten the 
financial stability of liable firms, which in extreme cases can lead to the bankruptcy of the 
company and transform the benchmark penalty to a de facto CDP.  However, this harsh 
punishment should only be reserved for corporations that have done nothing to comply with 
enforcement agencies. Thus, the sanctions that can risk the CDP are limited to two deterrence-
based variables: (1) the firm has not self-reported the crime and (2) the firm has not fully 
cooperated with enforcement agencies (Table 1).  
Moreover, I also mentioned the tradeoff between pervasiveness and broad liability. Whereas 
broad liability can be a useful tool for complete crime deterrence, in this thesis I argue that it 
would be appropriate to consider systematic criminal activity as a condition for harsh corporate 
punishments. As a result, crimes need to be pervasive, committed by more than just one rogue 
employee, to be eligible for the benchmark penalty (Table 1).  
 
If these three conditions are met, the benchmark penalty can be imposed. Although this would 
risk the CDP, from a deterrence standpoint, it would be vital that this penalty would be 
enforced.  
 
Table 1: Deterrence-based variables 
Table 1 shows the three variables that would allow the use of the benchmark penalty from a deterrence standpoint. 
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3. Collateral Consequences of the CDP  
In the previous sections, I elaborate on the framework of optimal deterrence and analyze how 
harsh fines are a necessary instrument to motivate corporate compliance. However, enforcing 
the benchmark penalty creates the risk of sanction-induced bankruptcy. Such bankruptcies 
could result in serious consequential costs to different parts of society, harming society in 
some cases well beyond the impacts of the original crime. Moreover, these consequences may 
also affect blameless third-party stakeholders, potentially threatening the viability of enforcing 
the benchmark penalty.  
In this section, I assess the extent of these consequences by analyzing how the different 
stakeholders would be affected by the potential bankruptcy induced by the benchmark penalty. 
I identify two variables to estimate the distribution of collateral consequences: market 
concentration and industry debt levels. I elaborate on the potential consequences first for firm-
related stakeholders, including employees and investors; and second for market-related 
stakeholder groups, consumers and producers. 
3.1 Employees  
It can be argued that employees are severely affected by the CDP and collateral effects of 
corporate liability (Atkinson, 2020; Hulpke, 2017). The foremost consequence for employees 
after a corporate bankruptcy is becoming unemployed due to layoffs (Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 
2010) and potentially remaining unemployed for long periods (Katz & Meyer, 1990). 
However, employees can also experience other long lasting economic and social effects, such 
as wage reductions (Davis, Faberman, & Haltiwanger, 2012; Graham, Kim, Li, & Qiu, 2013), 
reduced consumption, loss of housing (Hsu, Matsa, & Melzer, 2018), and declining health17 
(Burgard, Brand, & House, 2007). However, most of these collateral effects do not occur 
solely due to sanction induced bankruptcy. For example, they can also occur as a result of 
bankruptcy due to inefficiency and outsourcing of production (Hulpke, 2017). Hulpke (2017) 
argues that job loss is no excuse to let corporate crime run rampant. Hence, it can also be 
argued that the collateral consequences suffered by employees may in some cases be 
 
17 See also: Atkinson (2020) 
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outweighed by the greater harm that corporate criminality inflicts to the whole of society 
(Hulpke, 2017; Ramirez, 2005). 
3.2 Investors 
The second firm-related stakeholder group, the firm’s investors such as shareholders and 
bondholders, are not threatened to lose their job, but rather the capital they put into the firm18. 
Some views categorize shareholders as innocent and blameless for any corporate criminal 
involvement19, and criticize how corporate sanctions harm investor’s wealth (Alschuler, 2009; 
Coffee, 1981; Lederman, 1985; Ramirez, 2005). 
However, not all shareholders are equally affected by bankruptcy. Bankruptcy has nearly no 
effect on institutional investors, mainly due to the effects of diversification20 (Akhigbe et al., 
2005). By holding a variety of securities in a portfolio, investors can minimize idiosyncratic 
risk, which in this case means that even a large bankruptcy should not have a significant effect 
on the overall value of their portfolio. Considering that in 2019 41% of the world market 
capitalization was held by institutional investors (De La Cruz, Medina, & Tang, 2019), the 
consequences of CDP on the shareholders of the convicted firm may be less than anticipated. 
Creditors of the CDP convicted company can similarly suffer losses (Coffee, 1981), as they 
face the risk of not recuperating their investment in full in the event of bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, creditors are first in line when assets are liquidated to investors. Thus, they 
should experience somewhat lesser consequences than equity holders, who get paid out last. 
Akhigbe et al. (2005) find that holders of secured debt remain largely unaffected by the 
bankruptcy of a firm, while holders of convertible and unsecured debt can experience 
significant losses. 
 
18 For example, Enron, an energy giant involved in an accounting scandal, had their price per share decrease from ~90$ 
December 2000 to less than $1 per share in December 2001 (Folger, 2011). 
19Lederman (1985) says that the influence of shareholders on the business is rather fictional and questions how they can be 
held responsible for crimes they had no part in. 
20 Akhigbe, Martin, and Whyte (2005) are focusing their research on the Worldcom bankruptcy, the in 2005 still largest 
bankruptcy in history. During the financial crisis in 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers superseded.  
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In contrast to advocates of the shareholder’s innocence, others also acknowledge the collateral 
effect on investors while arguing that investors should not be considered victims (Atkinson, 
2020). Arguments for this are that firms are run in the interests of shareholders and for their 
benefit, which compensates them for the risk they take with their investments. This principle 
can be expanded to creditors, who get higher interest depending on the risk that a company 
defaults and the losses for them upon default. Moreover, the financial loss for shareholders 
creates incentives to demand proper compliance in the first place to avoid any value reducing 
events. In summary, although investors may suffer substantial losses under the enforcement 
of the benchmark penalty, it can be argued that these potential losses are not necessarily 
collateral damage for blameless stakeholders, but rather a valid outcome of the risk they take 
as investors, as well as a useful tool to create compliance incentives. 
3.3 Consumers  
In general, the removal of a company could harm consumers, one of the market-related major 
stakeholders, because it removes a product that was available for consumption. In some cases, 
a product can be easily substituted, and the consumer consequences are minimized; in other 
cases, such as for unique pharmaceutical products, consumers might have a preference over 
substitutes, or substitutes are not available. This could potentially create severe consequences, 
lasting at least until a proper replacement for the product is found. 
Moreover, apart from the unavailability of certain products, consumers can be affected by the 
CDP through its effect on market competition. Competition can be defined as a rivalry between 
groups (Vickers, 1995). Hence, the degree of competition in an industry is dependent on the 
degree of rivalry. In markets where only few firms operate, it is easier to collude and 
collaborate, which can result in a decrease of the level of rivalry and hence the degree of 
competition. With more firms in an industry, the ability to collude decreases and therefore can 
the number of firms be a decisive factor in estimating the degree of competition. 
More competition can result in substantial benefits, leading to increased wages and promoting 
innovation and productivity (Philippon, 2019). Furthermore, competition can decrease prices, 
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benefiting consumers through an increase in consumer surplus21, which can in turn manifest 
itself in an increase in disposable income and enhanced spending-ability (Philippon, 2019). 
The advantages that consumers have from high levels of competition creates a dilemma for 
the imposition of the CDP. Once the benchmark penalty is sentenced and enforced, in extreme 
cases, the corporation could not cover the costs of conviction, go bankrupt and eventually exit 
the market. As the CDP decreases the number of firms in the industry, it is therefore often an 
anti-competitive instrument that could prove to be harmful to consumers22. 
Furthermore, less competition also increases the profit margins for the remaining corporations 
in the industry23 (Grullon, Larkin, & Michaely, 2019). Although higher profits could be 
created through more efficient asset utilization in more concentrated industries, Grullon et al. 
(2019), as well as Barkai (2016), find that the increase in returns are due to increased markups 
which manifest in inflated prices for consumers. This would expel the benefits of competition 
for consumers and negatively affect consumer surplus. 
One of the fundamentals of production is that, in a perfectly competitive market, a producer 
should not be able to gain long term profits. All firms are price takers24, since no firm has the 
influence and market power to adjust prices, and all firms set their output such that marginal 
costs of production are equal to the price (point E0 in Figure 1). A single case of the CDP in 
a very competitive industry would therefore have little impact on prices, as the remaining firms 
have no market power and remain relatively dependent on the price that is set by the market. 
However, if a company suddenly gains competitive advantages, they can affect the price 
without losing all of their demand. In the most extreme case, the CDP could force one firm 
after another out of business, until a competitive or oligopolistic industry turns into a 
monopolistic one. In such a scenario, a firm would reduce output to the level where marginal 
 
21 Consumer surplus is a measurement of consumer benefits. It shows the benefit that consumers receive for paying less for 
a product that they were willing to pay more for. In contrast, producer surplus is the benefit that producers have when they 
sell a product above the minimum price that they would be willing to sell it for.  
22 In theory, the CDP could exclude a market participant that vehemently restricted market efficiency. In such a case, the CDP 
could prove to be promoting industry competition rather than limiting it. Consumers could then actually benefit from the 
CDP. While this could affect the viability of the CDP, it is outside the scope of this study.  
23 Higher profits for corporations could naturally also mean more employment and better wages, but Philippon (2019) finds 
that profits from competitive advantage are often paid out to shareholders in dividends and used for share buybacks. 
24 In competitive industries, firms must produce at the price given by the market, since they lack market power to change it 
and are easily substituted by competitors if they try to increase prices anyway. 
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costs and marginal revenue are the same (Point S in Figure 2) to maximize profits. At this 
level, prices would increase, and demand would decrease. This market would no longer be in 
a perfect equilibrium of supply and demand, but rather in an inefficient equilibrium (Point E1 
Figure 2), which reduces consumer surplus and creates a welfare loss (grey area, Figure 2). 
This welfare loss, also defined as a deadweight loss25, signals for example that some 
consumers are not able to buy the product anymore, as the price is above their willingness to 
pay, and that remaining consumers suffer reduced disposable income which also affects their 
spending on other industries (Philippon, 2019). 
 
The degree of competition however plays a crucial role in defining the impact of the anti-
competitive effect of sanctions (Auriol & Søreide, 2017). Without a high degree of market 
concentration, it remains unlikely that the CDP would inflict heavy burdens on consumers via 
price inflations. Only once the market is no longer considered competitive, could the increased 
market power of producers through a CDP manifest in collateral consequences for consumers. 
Nevertheless, to avoid a transition from a competitive market scenario (Figure 1) to a 
monopolistic market scenario (Figure 2), enforcement agencies should always consider the 
changing degree of competitiveness before and after the potential infliction of a CDP. If 
 
25 A deadweight loss means that the Economic surplus, which is consumer plus producer surplus, has been reduced due to the 
market inefficiency. 
Figure 1: Equilibrium in competitive 
markets 
Figure 1: Equilibrium in concentrated 
markets 
Figure 1 shows the Equilibrium in a competitive 
industry and the area of CS and PS 
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium in a now concentrated 
industry. The shift in market power creates a new 
equilibrium in E1. 
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avoiding major harm for consumers is a priority, then the CDP should only be risked in 
competitive markets. 
3.4 Producers  
Through the same principle that consumers are harmed by the CDP, the second market-related 
stakeholder, the remaining producers, could benefit from the sanction induced bankruptcy of 
a rival by gaining competitive advantage. However, industry contagion effects also play a role, 
and could create negative externalities for producers. In the following, I examine the different 
ramifications that a firm’s competitors can face after it has been subject to a CDP. 
Lang and Stulz (1992) analyze the effect of bankruptcy on competitor by examining industry 
wide stock price reactions26 and find two effects of corporate bankruptcy: the contagion and 
competitive effect27. The contagion effect28 generally results in a negative stock price response 
of competitors’ stocks29(Ferris et al., 1997). This negative reaction is mostly due to the reveal 
of negative cash flow information in the bankruptcy filing. A firm that has similar cash flow 
as the failing firm could be perceived to have also similar problems in their operations. 
However, when the bankruptcy is prompted by purely idiosyncratic reasons then no new 
information about the industry should be revealed (Lang & Stulz, 1992). This is an important 
implication for the CDP since this penalty would only induce bankruptcy due to the existence 
of firm-specific corporate criminal acts30. The contagion effect from cash flow information 
could be mitigated in these cases.  
In addition, there is also a reputational contagion effect of a firm’s bankruptcy on competitors 
(Lang & Stulz, 1992). After the publication of a serious criminal case, investors and customers 
 
26 In general, stock prices are critical for the wealth of the large industry shareholder group. However, more importantly they 
also reflect a corporation’s financial health. Corporations can indirectly benefit from higher stock prices which enable them 
cheaper financing though seasoned equity offerings and also cost-efficient stock-acquisitions. 
27 Further effects of bankruptcy on producers exist. For example, Benmelech and Bergman (2011) find increased cost of debt 
due to fire sales and its negative effect on a firm’s collateral assets. Choi and Cho (2018) find that innovation is reduced, since 
firms are focusing more on short-term efficiencies instead of long-term commitments that are necessary for innovation. 
28 The contagion effect is often discussed with a focus on the financial industry. See Akhigbe and Madura (2001) and Helwege 
and Zhang (2016) 
29 Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) find that for every dollar lost for the bankrupt firm, competitors would lose $3.32. 
30 An exception would be industry wide collusion or cartels. 
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could change their impression on the entire industry, and be less optimistic about its future 
value, potentially affecting the dealings of competitors with business partners. The negative 
effect should also exist when a firm is announcing financial distress due to criminal behavior, 
as the entire industry could be under increased scrutiny of undertaking criminal activity as 
well31. 
The extent of the contagion effect can be substantially affected by the industry leverage levels 
(Lang & Stulz, 1992). The greater the debt of competitors, the higher their equity elasticity, 
which would amplify negative stock price effects. Moreover, the more leverage a firm has, the 
higher is the present value of direct bankruptcy cost32. Thus, negative contagion effects are 
more impactful, and the consequences for producers after a CDP more severe, in highly 
leveraged industries. 
The competitive effect, the other relevant effect of corporate bankruptcy on producers, 
generally implies a positive value response on producers (Lang & Stulz, 1992). The CDP of a 
firm can be beneficial for competitors through the reallocation of wealth and growing 
competitive advantage, like increased demand, reduced costs, or increased margins through 
higher prices (Kolay, 2018). This effect stands in the exact opposite of the consumer effect 
discussed in the previous section, as the price increase benefits producers but harms 
consumers. However, as the harm on consumers is only tangible through a CDP in 
concentrated markets, the competitive effect for producers exists also only in concentrated 
industries, where gaining producer rent and more market power is possible (Akhigbe et al., 
2005; Kolay, 2018; Lang & Stulz, 1992). 
The relation between the competitive effect and the leverage levels is not as straightforward 
as in the case of the contagion effect. On the one hand, similar to the contagion effect, large 
industry debt levels result in higher elasticity of equity which would further increase stock 
prices from competitive benefits. On the other hand, a great amount of debt can also reduce 
flexibility and the competitor’s ability to benefit from emerging opportunities that arise in the 
aftermath of a bankruptcy (Lang & Stulz, 1992). Thus, high leverage levels are related to a 
 
31 For example, Nelson (2017) calls corruption in financial markets the norm. 
32 Direct bankruptcy costs are expenses related to a bankruptcy filing. A firm with more leverage has higher probability to go 
bankrupt and hence a higher present value of bankruptcy costs, which results in a higher negative effect of contagion.  
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both positive and negative impact on the competitive effect, and a robust relation between debt 
levels and the extent of competitive effects cannot be established. 
In summary, the bankruptcy of a firm can have either positive or negative consequences for 
competitors, depending on which of the two effects dominates33. However, as Lang and Stulz 
(1992) find, the degree of leverage and market concentration can give an important implication 
to these effects. Market concentration is unrelated to the contagion effect, while directly 
affecting the competitive effect. Industry leverage levels are ambiguously related to the 
competitive effect, while directly influencing the contagion effect. 
Table 2: Effect on producers 
Table 2 shows how market competition and leverage levels determine the effect for producers after a bankruptcy in their 
industry. 
As illustrated in table 2, a positive effect on producers is created when sanction induced 
bankruptcy occurs in an industry with low leverage levels, implying smaller contagion effects, 
and with high market concentration, implying larger competitive effects for the remaining 
firms, which gain competitive advantage from the bankruptcy. A negative effect is produced 
when the industry is highly levered, which creates a higher contagion effect, and when the 
market is highly competitive, which prevents any rent seeking through increased prices. 
Likewise, a negative effect would exist in competitive markets when leverage is low, since 
although the contagion effect would be less severe, the competitive effect is absent. Lastly, 
the effect on competitor’s after a CDP is uncertain in concentrated markets with high leverage. 
 
33Ferris et al. (1997) also analyze stock price reactions and conclude that the contagion effect dominates, since they find little 
evidence for the competitive effect. However, their analysis is focused on the bankruptcy filing as the event window. The 
authors hypothesize that by that time competitive advantages could be already priced in the competitors’ equity. In contrast 
Iqbal (2002) finds no evidence for contagion effect in his study, while Goins and Gruca (2008) say the competitive effect 
could dominate if causes for distress are idiosyncratic.  
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In this scenario, the positive competitive effect is opposed by the negative contagion effect of 
high leverage, which makes the overall impact on producers case-specific, depending on 
which effect dominates over the other. 
3.5 Consequence-based Variables 
In this section, I elaborate on different firm-related and market-related stakeholders and the 
potential consequences of the CDP on them. Although the losses of firm-related stakeholders 
such as employees and investors contribute to the total fallout of sanction-induced bankruptcy; 
these losses are, respectively, either not exclusively related to the CDP, or considered an 
assumed risk. For these reasons, these groups are not considered for estimating the collateral 
consequences of the CDP in this framework and I focus on the market-related stakeholders, 
consumers, and producers. To estimate the extent of the effect of the CDP, I deduct two 
consequence-based variables: market concentration and industry leverage (Table 3). High 
market concentration relates to harmful effects on consumers via price increases, but also to 
benefits in competitive advantages for producers. On the other hand, leverage levels can give 
an indication of harmful consequences on producers via industry contagion effects. 
Table 3: Consequence-based variables 
Table 3 shows the variables that can determine the collateral consequences after a CDP for consumers and producers. 
3.6 Shifting Costs and Discounting Penalties 
So far, I have analyzed consequences on different parts of society and deducted the 
consequence-based variables. Here, I want to briefly extend the microeconomic concerns, 
which are related to the consequences to consumers, and elaborate on possible ways for 
corporations under scrutiny to lessen the impact of the CDP. 
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3.6.1 Shifting the Sanction 
Previously, I described how the CDP could decrease competition and induce price inflations 
through newfound or additional market power. I already distinguished that in order to avoid 
major consequences to consumers, the CDP could hence only be applied in competitive 
markets. An additional aspect that I briefly examine is how market concentration affects a 
firm’s ability to shift the burden of the benchmark penalty. 
Through the benchmark penalty, the risk of the CDP is created but not its certainty. If a firm 
goes out of business at the end is dependent on how it can deal with the financial burden. For 
example, once a firm in a competitive industry is subject to a high fine their marginal costs 
would increase and the cost curve would shift to the left. Ideally, they would want to increase 
prices to shift the burden of the fine to consumers which could help them cope with any 
financial distress after a sentencing. However, firms in competitive markets are still price 
takers and an individual firm could not inflate prices in an intent to let consumers absorb part 
of the financial impact. Due to the high degree of competition, consumers would rather just 
switch to a different supplier, who can maintain offering the market price. 
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However, in concentrated, monopolistic industries, firms already have market power. A 
monopolistic firm that is subject to the benchmark penalty would have the same shift in 
marginal costs that a competitive firm would face (MC to MC2 in Figure 3). The monopolistic 
corporation wants once again to produce at a level where marginal costs and marginal revenues 
are equal, in order to maximize profits. This incentive would result in a further reduction of 
quantity produced and raise prices for consumers even more, as we can see in the shift of point 
E1 to E2 in figure 3. 
In such a scenario, a firm could lessen the impact of the penalty by increasing prices and 
shifting parts of the burden to consumers. As seen by the area marked in grey in the figure 3, 
further welfare would be lost. The welfare loss consists of a reduction in producer surplus, 
since a firm would nevertheless have been better off without the incremental costs, but also in 
a decrease of consumer surplus, since a part of the impact is now absorbed by the consumers 
through price increases.   
Figure 2: Change of costs in concentrated markets 
Figure 3 shows the shift in the MC curve and the following change in equilibrium from E1 to E2 and the increase in 
price from P1 to P2. 
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Ultimately, we can examine that the benchmark penalty could increase costs for an individual 
firms, which in a monopolistic industry could lead to further price increases and welfare loss, 
manifesting itself through producer but also consumer surplus reduction. Thus, subjecting 
monopolistic firms to the benchmark penalty would be critically difficult if enforcement 
agencies want to avoid any fallout on consumers.  
3.6.2 Penalty Impact Discounts 
In prominent corporate criminal cases, the press is often promoting the “large” penalties that 
are inflicted on corporations, however the de facto imposed penalty might be less than what is 
expressed to the public. For example, in the United States, corporations can file for two types 
of bankruptcy: chapter 7 and chapter 11. A chapter 7 filing means that a corporation goes out 
of business (United States Courts, 2020). The US government appoints then a trustee to sell 
all assets and redistribute their value to stakeholders. However, in chapter 11 bankruptcy, the 
filing corporation can continue operating as usual34. The main goal of chapter 11 is the 
reorganization of the enterprise. This means that under strict government supervision, the 
company could downsize operations, sell assets, or try to renegotiate debt in order to return to 
profitability. An interesting insight is that one of the largest creditors would be the same 
government who issued the benchmark penalty that induced corporate bankruptcy. A company 
in distress could therefore readjust the level of penalty post-conviction via debt negotiations. 
Similar bankruptcy systems also exist in Europe35. The bottom line is that bankruptcy not 
automatically means corporate death and that corporations can restructure and mediate ways 
to stay operative.  
An additional critical feature of the punishment for corporations is the time frame, in which 
they have to pay the penalty. A short time frame makes payment of a harsh fine increasingly 
difficult to handle, but if a company can pay in multiple installments, stretched over numerous 
years then the penalty can be managed more effortlessly. Longer periods to pay the fine could 
 
34 Normally a corporation can continue operating under the same management, but if the bankruptcy is induced by fraud or 
dishonesty, a trustee can be appointed to take over. See: United States Courts (2020) 
35 In Germany, a bankrupt corporation can offer a redevelopment plan to emerge from insolvency (§270 b Insolvenzordnung 
InsO, German Insolvency Law)   
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affect the deterrent value of the benchmark penalty, as more time to pay means less short-term 
financial harm36.  
Finally, the tax deductibility of fines can play an important role in the de facto amount that a 
corporation must pay. In the United States, fines that must be paid to the government are 
generally not applicable for tax deduction. However, this law does not hold for the wide-spread 
use of NTR. A settlement is categorically different than a fine, and thus many cases that 
involved NTRs result in the corporation’s ability to deduct parts of the fine from their tax 
payments. For example, in 10 major U.S. settlements that amounted to a total value of 80 
billion USD in fines, at least 48 billion USD were applicable for tax deduction (Surka, 2015). 
In Europe, fines and penalties that need to be paid to enforcement agencies are in general also 
not deductible. However, for example Germany prohibits tax deduction of fines37, but not for 
payments meant for reparation and the skimming off economic profits (Kuilwijk & Phelan, 
2010). A precedent would be the 1 billion Euro penalty on Volkswagen AG in 2018. Only 5 
million Euro of the penalty was considered a fine, while the remaining 995 million Euro were 
meant to skim off the economic gain from the crime, which makes them tax deductible (Public 
Prosecution Lower Saxony, 2018). Therefore, some accounting loopholes to write off 
payments do exist also in European legislation38.  
Here, I listed some of the ways in which a corporation can decrease the de facto impact of a 
sanction. Consequently, the deterrence effect of the CDP could be reduced in some cases. It is 
vital to be aware of these affects, as some companies might go out of business when subjected 
to the CDP, all the while other firms remain undeterred since they believe they are able to 
influence the real value of any possible sanctions, for example through either debt 
renegotiation or longer periods for payments. 
 
36 Spending large amount of cash for sanction payments is costly as firms lose the opportunity to invest it and gain interest 
on it. Longer periods to pay a fine would allow corporations to invest in risk free assets and use the proceeds for the down 
payments. A corporations can therefore choose to surrender less of their own capital to pay the sanction. For literature on 
investment decisions see: Berk and DeMarzo (2016)  
37 See §12, paragraph 4 Einkommenssteuergesetz (EstG)- Income Tax Act 
38 With regard to the benchmark penalty, the implication of these loopholes is not as clear. In general, if the benchmark 
penalty has been sentenced through a court verdict, tax deductibility should be impossible for corporations. 
 33
3.7 Summary of the Theory 
So far, I have addressed two questions: When can a CDP be enforced based on a deterrence 
standpoint and when does it generate harmful consequences for consumers or producers? To 
answer these questions, I have analyzed literature on optimal deterrence, and collateral 
implications of harsh penalties.  
Corporations have powerful and effective measures of prevention and policing at hand to deter 
crime. However, to induce these measures corporate liability is needed. By enforcing the 
harshest sanction which can risk the CDP, only when a corporation did not self-report their 
crime or fully cooperate, enforcement agencies can establish a framework that creates the 
highest incentive to comply. Moreover, Hamdani and Klement (2007) support a pervasiveness 
standard for the use of harsh penalties, in order to keep the harshest systematic punishment 
limited to only systematic crime. A pervasiveness standard would allow corporation to avoid 
experiencing the CDP when only one rogue employee has committed a crime. Thus, I find 
three deterrence-based variables for the use of the benchmark penalty: (1) the crime was not 
self-reported, (2) the firm did not fully cooperate, (3) the crime is pervasive and thus 
committed by multiple employees (Table 4).  
By analyzing consequences on society, I derive the consequence-based variables: market 
concentration and industry leverage (Table 4). The extent of market concentration can give a 
signal about the harmful effects on consumers, which are lower when the market is very 
competitive, and the competitive benefits for producers, which can only exist in concentrated 
markets. Industry debt levels can indicate the extent of harm that producers face via the 
contagion effect, which is more expressed in highly levered industries (Lang & Stulz, 1992). 
With the degree of both market concentration and leverage, it is possible to estimate the 
severity of CDP consequences for producers and consumers.  
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Table 4: Deterrence-based variables and consequence-based variables 
Table 4 shows the combined deterrence and consequence-based variables Together they could determine whether the 
benchmark penalty is relevant to enforce and ho to what extent consumers and producers would be affected after a CDP. 
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4. Analysis 
I have deducted three deterrence-based and two consequence-based variables that estimate 
when the benchmark penalty and the risk of the CDP is relevant to enforce from a deterrence 
standpoint and which stakeholders are affected by corporate bankruptcy. In this section, I 
evaluate these variables to demonstrate the level of applicability of the benchmark penalty and 
the CDP in real corporate crime cases. While insufficient to prove causal relations, this 
analysis exhibits the real-life relevance of sanction induced bankruptcy. 
I analyse the original data sample provided by Auriol et al. (forthcoming), which contains 50 
completed enforcement cases that happened in five countries during the 2000s. Information 
about enforcement cases if often very limited, even to academic researchers, which makes the 
availability of this sample by Auriol et al. (forthcoming) even more advantageous for this 
thesis. The types of crimes from the sample are divided into 20 competition, 11 anti-money-
laundering (AML) and 19 corruption cases. The crimes historically were dealt with in the 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway, with 
each country assigned ten cases.  
In the first part of the analysis, I will apply the three deterrence-based variables, not self-
reported, no full cooperation and pervasiveness, on these cases to find if the benchmark 
penalty could have been used from a deterrence standpoint, which would give us an inclination 
in how many of these cases the CDP could have been risked. Following, I will analyse the 
consequence-based variables, market competition levels and the degree of leverage, for the 
CDP-relevant cases. Ultimately, I will determine whether collateral consequences would have 
either affected consumers or producers.   
4.1 Case Analysis: CDP Relevance 
To evaluate if the deterrence-based variables are met, I conduct a search in legal databases to 
examine court sentences and official statements, or use the Internet’s available search engines. 
However, several of these cases have been completed with NTR, and settled deals often 
involve limited transparency to the public (Auriol et al., forthcoming). For 12 of these cases 
information was too uncertain or not available to make a reasonable assumption about the 
variables and are hence excluded from further analysis. For other cases, although the available 
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information was insufficient to determine the state of the variables with complete certainty, it 
was sufficient to make assumptions about these variables based on proxy information. 
I distinguish between variables that were met39 (black checkmarks; Table A 1) and variables 
that were not met (black crosses; Table A 1) with certainty. I also differentiate the cases where 
the information was either concealed or unclear, but an assumption can still be made about the 
variables state (grey checkmarks and crosses; Table A 1). 
4.1.1 Results CDP Relevance 
From the remaining 38 cases, I find that the corporations did not self-report their crime 33 
times (87%) and reported it 5 times (13%). The firms did not fully cooperate in 16 cases (42%) 
but cooperated in 22 (58%). Except for two instances, all cases could be deemed pervasive 
(95%) (Table 5).  
The benchmark penalty can only be applied if all three relevance conditions have been met, 
which happens in 16 cases (42%) (Table A 1). From these 16 cases where the benchmark 
penalty could have been used, 12 are competition cases and 4 AML cases, with no 
corruption cases among them. The sentencing government was the United Kingdom in two, 
Germany in one, the Netherlands in four, Sweden in five and Norway in four cases.  
The low number of self-reports, in contrast to the high instances of full cooperation, could 
indicate that corporations are either hiding their crimes until it is revealed and only then start 
being compliant, for example to receive sanction reduction through a settlement. On the 
other hand, it may also indicate that corporations have no proper monitoring in place that 
 
39 In competition cases, where multiple companies colluded together, I make a checkmark if one of the corporations did not 
self-report or not fully-cooperate.  
Table 5: Results from deterrence-based variables 
Table 5 presents the results frrom the analysis. A checkmark and cross determines if the variable has been met or not, respectively. 
The grey simbols indicate that available information was not definite but the sources gave an indication about the variable. 
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would enable them to detect crime before enforcement agencies. Furthermore, I differentiate 
between full-cooperation and just willingness for cooperation. In some cases, like the 
“Nordea Decision (2015)” or the “Handelsbanken Decision (2015)”, the firm has engaged in 
cooperative acts, with the goal of sentence reduction. However, the court decided that their 
actions were not enough to be a mitigating factor. Although some aspects of the optimal 
liability framework, like sentence reduction only when a firm has fully cooperated, are 
implemented in certain jurisdictions, it seems that corporations are lacking the clarity and 
certainty of what is needed to receive the benefits of full cooperation. Either that or they had 
hopes of being granted alleviating benefits although they knew they did fulfill the 
requirements to deserve them. 
The pervasiveness standard is apparent in nearly all cases. In the two cases where I cannot 
confidently deduce that the condition was met, it would have made no difference for the 
imposition of the benchmark penalty, since in both cases, the firm self-reported and fully 
cooperated. Regarding the trade-off with broad liability and pervasiveness, it seems that this 
might be of less significance as originally anticipated. Including the pervasiveness variable 
or removing it to create a broad liability condition would have no effect on the original 
result.  
From the 38 cases, the benchmark fine could have been applied in 16 cases. This 42% share 
signals that corporations are not properly deterred by the threat of high fines. The result 
provides further insights to the level of practical implementation of optimal liability regimes. 
As I have established in Section 2, governments have yet to create the proper incentives for 
self-reporting and full cooperation that are vital to increase deterrence levels (Arlen, 2020).  
4.2 Case Analysis: Collateral Consequences 
To indicate to which extent consumers and producers are affected by the consequence of the 
CDP, I estimate the market concentration and debt levels for each industry of the 16 CDP-
relevant cases. To receive the degree of market concentration, this thesis again can benefit 
from the work and availability of the data provided by Auriol et al. (forthcoming). Auriol et 
al. (forthcoming) estimate in their research the relevant markets to be either concentrated or 
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competitive, using the Herfindahl-Index and the company specific Lerner Ratio40 (Table A 2). 
To estimate industry debt levels, I use Europe wide fundamental debt data provided by Aswath 
Damodaran (Damodaran, 2020)41. To decide whether an industry is either low or highly 
levered, I compare the debt to capital ratio from each industry to the total market ratio. I 
classify every industry’s debt ratio higher than the market ratio as high levered, and every ratio 
below it low levered (Table A 2)42.  
4.2.1 Results Collateral Consequences 
From the 16 cases that are benchmark penalty relevant, five are operating in a high levered 
industry (31%) while 11 are operating in industries with low debt levels (92%) (Table A 3). 
Concerning the degree of competition, it is not possible to estimate the value in four of the 16 
industries, mostly caused by the lack of financial data. From the remaining 12 cases, only one 
operated in a competitive market (8%), while the remaining experience high levels of market 
concentration (92%) (Table A 2).  
4.2.2 Extent of Collateral Consequences 
As I have discussed in section 3.3, consumers are harmed once the CDP is enforced in a 
concentrated market and I assume that they can get no immediate advantage from the CDP. 
The consequences for producers, the remaining firms in the industry, are ambiguous. Market 
concentration can trigger the competitive effect and create positive value effects for the 
industry. This effect is independent from leverage. The contagion effect can persist in 
concentrated and competitive markets; however, its extent is dependent on industry debt 
levels. Low leverage levels would limit the negative contagion effect, while high debt levels 
maximize it. We can make a clear assumption about the outcome of a CDP on producers, in 
cases where the CDP would be in concentrated markets with low leverage, assuming that the 
contagion effect is smaller than the competitive effect and in competitive markets, where only 
 
40 Auriol et al. (forthcoming) use a Lerner Ratio above 20% as an indicator for market concentration. 
41 I use Europe wide data as a proxy for industry leverage levels, although not all cases involve companies that operate 
internationally. However, I assume that incentives to accumulate high or low amounts of debt are similar in European 
countries.  
42 Note that two cases can have the same industry and same indication of leverage level but different estimates for market 
concentration. Leverage is derived from Industry data, while Concentration levels are estimated by looking at the specific 
company and its competitors.  
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the contagion effect persists. Instances in concentrated markets with high debt levels give 
uncertain results, as contagion and competitive effect challenge each other.  
From the 16 cases, I can only make an indication for the consequences in twelve of them, as 
four are having missing information in the degree of market concentration (Table A 2).  
Since 11 out of 12 cases where in concentrated markets, consumers would suffer consequences 
in 11 instances (Table 6). Producers vice versa would benefit seven times from the decreasing 
competition and a low contagion effect. However, in four cases, the crime occurred in 
concentrated markets with high leverage. Therefore, the consequences for producers remain 
unclear. Only in one case can I deduct that producers would have been harmed, as high market 
competition prevents competitive advantages.  
The results indicate that consumers are the most affected stakeholder group. This could be due 
to a sample bias, since only 8 of the original 50 cases are determined to operate in competitive 
industries. On the other hand, crimes also happen more often in concentrated industries (Auriol 
et al., forthcoming), which would explain the many cases in concentrated markets.  However, 
regardless of the allocation of crime to concentrated and competitive industries, this case 
approach shows that consumers would be frequently harmed by the CDP. In contrast to 
consumers, producers can benefit in seven cases from the CDP. This is reasonable due to the 
previously established relationship between producers and consumers. Producers can benefit 
from the competitive advantage that can lead to increased prices, which ultimately harm 
consumers. This relation also works vice versa, as we can see in the one case where producers 
suffer negative consequences and consumer do not. However, in four cases the effect on 
producers remains unclear, which could result in difficulties estimating the potential effect of 
the CDP.  
In summary, I have distinguished the cases where the benchmark penalty would be relevant to 
enforce from a deterrence standpoint, and also where the main collateral consequence would 
occur. As a final point, I address the question if this high penalty and the resulting risk of 
Consumer Harm Producer Harm Producer Benefit Producer effect unclear
# 11 1 7 4
% 92% 8% 58% 33%
Table 6: Consequences on consumers and producers 
Table 6 shows the consumers and producers harm or benefit from the CDP. The hash mark states the number of instances 
consumers or producers are effected out of 12 cases.The percentage symbol determines the share of the number of instances  
consumers or producers are affected out of  the total 12 cases. 
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In this section, I first examine when governments could find risking the CDP appropriate. 
Moreover, I discuss a potential extension on the framework of corporate liability, and relevant 
aspects for future research. Finally, I address the limitations of this study and potential policy 
implications. 
5.1 Governments Political Inclination 
So far, I have established optimal framework and grouped the potential consequences of the 
CDP. In this section, I want to elaborate on the importance of political priorities and how a 
specific government's idea of what is good for society can impact the use of the CDP. On the 
one hand, governments may focus on protecting corporate profits, while assuming that these 
profits translate into their associated societal benefits. On the other hand, governments may 
assume a more active role and decide to directly protect society and its consumers, in lieu of 
corporate profit. In this section, I first use a quantifiable variable, the corporate tax rate, to 
identify which of these two lines of action different governments would favor. Second, I 
analyze in how many of the CDP-relevant cases governments could have actually enforced 
the benchmark penalty, or whether they would have blocked any harsh prosecution to avoid 
the collateral consequences, according to their producer versus consumer emphasis. 
5.1.1 Consumer and Producer Emphasis 
The sentencing in corporate crime cases is ultimately given by enforcement agencies and the 
judiciary. Through the principles of separation of power, the government, the executive 
branch, should have little access to the decision-making process of corporate crime sentencing. 
However, regulations of corporate punishment are not as clearly structured as other parts of 
the law. In fact, enforcement agencies often have a degree of flexibility to make decisions, 
which allows them to alter sanctions and negotiate with firms for NTR. This flexibility creates 
an opportunity for governments to influence the final decision on a corporate sanction, for 
example in the form of shielding the firm from harsh sanctions (Auriol et al., forthcoming). 
Countries can differ substantially in the flexibility of prosecution, nevertheless even in very 
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de jure inflexible countries43, like the UK, governments have proven their ability to make an 
effect on the enforcement of corporate crime cases44. Thus, governments, in practice, have the 
power to decide whether they want to interfere in the enforcement of corporate liability. 
This decision can be influenced by the incentives a government has to control corporate crime. 
Auriol et al. (forthcoming) find that this incentive depends on how much a government values 
corporate profits, and also the harmful consequences of the corporate offense. In this thesis, I 
extend this framework by arguing that as governments can be motivated by the consequences 
of crime, they can also be motivated by the consequences of punishment, which would be the 
repercussions on stakeholders after a CDP.  
A government can have multiple motivations to value corporate profit. Foremost, larger profits 
imply larger corporate tax revenue for governments, regardless of how high their corporate 
tax rate of the country is. But furthermore, larger corporate profits can have additional 
beneficial effects for society that governments may value. For example, larger profits could 
mean higher wages and employment rates (York, 2018). Moreover, it could lead to corporate 
cash reserves for economic downturns, which would help stabilize the firm and thus the 
employment. Finally, profits could also be used to invest in research and development, which 
could create better products for society or higher productivity. All of these reasons give 
governments rational incentives to protect producers and their profits45. 
 On the other hand, some corporations might decide to not spend profits on any of these causes 
beneficial for society, and spend them to benefit only a few instead, for example by issuing 
dividends for their shareholders. Hence, governments might also be rationally inclined to not 
put that much emphasis on protecting corporate profits, and instead focus on protecting 
consumers and consumer surplus. For example, by promoting competition, governments could 
keep prices low and consumer surplus high, albeit reducing producer surplus. Moreover, they 
 
43 See Søreide and Vagle (2020) 
44 An example would be the BAE Systems case, in which the then prime minister Tony Blain interfered in the investigations 
and shielded the company from harsh sanctions, although ample evidence for BAE’s involvement in corporate crime was 
available. See: Auriol et al. (forthcoming) 
45 In contrast, governments can also be captured, implying that they make decisions to protect corporations that are irrational. 
However, the fact that a government decides to protect producers is not necessarily an indication for capture, as they might 
just consider the social consequences of harming industries (Auriol et al., forthcoming). 
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could increase the corporate tax rate to reduce the profits for corporations while increasing the 
government budget for public expenditures46.  
The decision whether governments interfere in the enforcement of corporate liability partially 
depends on how much they tend to value corporate profits and harmful consequences (Auriol 
et al., forthcoming). Thus, the degree of emphasis governments put on producers and 
consumers could be a pivotal factor in their decision. If governments put a higher degree of 
emphasis on consumers, they would tend to avoid any collateral harm on them; similarly if 
governments value producers and corporate profits. Governments could be inclined to allow 
the enforcement of the benchmark penalty in order to gain the optimal deterrence benefits only 
when the favored stakeholder is not critically affected by the consequences of the CDP. With 
this insight, two governments faced with the decision whether to enforce the benchmark 
penalty could reach two contradicting decisions on whether the risk of the CDP is appropriate, 
based on the degree of emphasis on either consumers or producers alone. By identifying where 
this emphasis lies for each government and assessing whether CDP consequences affect more 
heavily either producers or consumers in each of the CDP-relevant cases, I can identify 
whether governments could have deemed the risk of the CDP appropriate in these cases. 
5.1.2 Estimating Government Emphasis 
Before analysing whether a government would find it appropriate to enforce the benchmark 
penalty in the case sample, I measure the degree of emphasis a government puts on either 
consumers or producers using the corporate tax rate as a proxy. Corporate taxes have a direct 
impact on corporate profits. Governments that put more emphasis on producers and the 
potential benefits of increased profits would be motivated to keep these taxes low. On the other 
hand, high corporate taxes lead to higher state income that could be spent for public benefits 
and consumers. Thus, a high corporate tax rate could indicate a high consumer emphasis and 
a lower emphasis on producers, and vice versa. To quantify this emphasis, I collect data 
 
46 A extension here would be the geographic location of cost and benefits of the criminal act. For example if consumers in 
another country are harmed, either through the crime or consequences of the CDP, a government would have little incentives 
to internalize these costs. An exception could be in regions with international cooperation, where integrity and collaboration 
are valued and countries can be motivated to take harmful consequences for consumers in other jurisdiction into account, like 
in the European Union, where supranational bodies are present (Auriol et al., forthcoming). Since all the cases in this thesis 
are located in Europe, I assume that the geographic location does not take a primary role going forward. 
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provided by KPMG (2020a) on corporate tax rates from 2010 to 2020 from members of the 
OECD. 
By comparing the mean tax rate over time for each country with the overall OECD median, I 
estimate the government's emphasis on consumers or producers. I classify countries with a 
mean tax above the median to have a government consumer emphasis, while countries with a 
lower than the median corporate tax are classified to have a government producer emphasis 
(Table A 4). For the countries where the cases in this thesis occur - the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway - this corporate tax classification implies that 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway have a consumer emphasis, while the United Kingdom 
and Sweden have a producer emphasis (Table A 4.). 
However, ruling regimes and corporate tax rates may change with time, and in turn the 
consumers vs. producers emphasis classification may change as well. Thus, these corporate 
tax policy changes over time can have a confounding effect of this classification based on 
mean tax rates over time. On the other hand, these corporate tax rate changes do not happen 
overnight with a change of government, but rather may take from months to several years to 
materialize. Thus, basing this classification on corporate tax rates synchronous to the case 
sentencing may not reflect the government's emphasis accurately. For these reasons, I use both 
a mean over time corporate tax rates as well as synchronous rates to classify governmental 
emphasis for this analysis. 
5.1.3 Appropriateness Using Mean Corporate Tax Rate Emphasis 
Applying the government emphasis estimates on the 12 CDP-relevant and complete cases, 
shows that the governments could have find risking the CDP appropriate in three out 12 
instances (Table A 5). Germany and the Netherlands only have cases in concentrated markets, 
where consumers would be harmed, and as consumer emphasised governments, they would 
refrain from pursuing harsh sanctions that could risk corporate bankruptcy. Similarly, Norway 
is confronted with harmful consequences for consumers and would thus refrain from enforcing 
the benchmark penalty in two cases. However, in one case the high market competition would 
limit the negative effect of the CDP on consumers, which implies that Norway could have 
enforced the benchmark penalty in this case. Producers would feel the consequences due to 
the high contagion effect, but the government could still find the enforcement appropriate.  
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Moreover, Sweden who puts a higher weight on producers, could have enforced the 
benchmark penalty in two cases, since although consumers would be harmed, producers would 
benefit from the competitive effect, all the while the contagion effect is minimized due to low 
debt levels. However, three of Sweden’s cases remain unclear. Nonetheless, this uncertainty 
could provide an indication in itself. When the government does not know if and where 
consequence of a CDP would gather, it increases risk. Moreover, governments are risk averse 
and “happier to do nothing or little rather than do something that might lead them to be blamed 
for failure” (Harris, 2014). Uncertainty about the fallout of the benchmark penalty could 
therefore be treated with extreme caution and would rather motivate avoiding benchmark 
penalties that can risk the CDP.  
In conclusion, we originally had 16 cases in which the benchmark penalty could have been 
enforced, based on a deterrence standpoint. I categorized the collateral consequences for 12 of 
them and from these remaining 12, the government could have risked the CDP in three cases, 
based on the categorization of consequences and the countries degree of emphasis.  
5.1.4 Appropriateness Using Yearly Corporate Tax Rate Emphasis  
In the last analysis, I used mean corporate tax rates to estimate a government’s weight on 
producers or consumers. However, a government can change their emphasis every election 
cycle. We can see that for example in the United States, where the corporate tax fell from 40% 
in 2016 to only 27% in 2018, a fall caused by a change of the ruling regime. In contrast, other 
countries do not change their respective taxes over time (Figure 4). As much as eight countries 
have not adjusted their taxes in the last 11 years. Looking at the development over time in 
figure 4, we see that some of the case relevant countries experience a downward shift in their 
taxes. Note however that although the median corporate tax is slightly decreasing, it hovers at 
a ~24% level. This could imply that for some countries, the decision could have been different 
from the mean-analysis.  
 
 46
Hence, I analyse how a governments emphasis is affecting the likelihood of enforcing the 
CDP, based only on the corporate tax in the year where the sentencing was given. In nine of 
the 12 cases, the emphasis remains unchanged (Table A 6). However, in the Sweden “Asphalt 
cartel (2009)” case, the corporate tax rate suggest that the government was rather consumer 
than producer focused47. Due to the high market concentration, the CDP would have not been 
enforced in that case. Moreover, Norway puts a higher degree of emphasis in 2019 on 
producers, which switches the result in the cases of “Koppang Landbruks- og Næringsmegling 
AS (2019)” and the “Sædberg & Hodne AS (2019)”. The latter case that was previously 
appropriate to enforce by Norway would now have been shielded from harsh sanctions to 
protect producers. In contrast, the “Koppang Landbruks- og Næringsmegling AS (2019)” case 
would inherit benefits for producers once the CDP is enforced and hence Norway could find 
harsh penalties appropriate. Ultimately, using synchronous corporate tax rates rather than 
mean over time tax rates reduces the number of instances the CDP could have been enforced 
down to only two. 
 
47 I used the 2010 corporate tax rate from Sweden, which is nearly equal than the one from 2009. See Ydstedt (2013) 
1 
Figure 3: Corporate tax rate over time 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of corporate tax rates in OECD member states. The dotted line shows the evolution of the 
median, while the coloured lines represent the five case relevant countries 
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5.2 Outlook and Limitations 
In this section, I want to address several caveats and outlooks that I have so far not discussed. 
First, I address an additional consequence from the CDP on producers: The ability to attract 
investors. Second, I elaborate on the damages on employees, that I have discussed earlier, and 
analyse a promising proposal of mandatory equity issuances to reduce collateral consequences 
for the workforce and other stakeholders. I then address the impartiality of the framework that 
I have discussed in this thesis. Ultimately, I mention possible limitations for this study. 
5.2.1 Ability to Attract Investors 
As a final comment on potential consequences on producers, I want to address the ability to 
attract investors and raise capital as an interesting potential fallout of the application of the 
CDP. 
Traditionally, the literature characterizes investors as rational beings, making investments 
purely based on expected return and risk (Beal, Goyen, & Philips, 2005; Markowitz, 1959; 
Miller & Modigliani, 1961)48. Thus, for a rational investor, the CDP could increase the 
associated risk for a different company to be subjected to a sanction-induced bankruptcy. The 
use of the CDP in an industry could, like the contagion effect, change investors perception of 
the entire industry and the associated risk to expected returns ratio. As a result, investors might 
shift their capital to other industries, where the sharp ratio is higher4950. An increased scrutiny 
about the market could create problems for firms to raise capital to engage in profitable 
projects, either through equity issuance or debt51. As the demand for an industry’s stock 
decreases, a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) would also be more expensive to implement. A 
 
48 The basis of rational investment decision is derived on the works of Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Markowitz (1959). 
See: Beal et al. (2005)  
49 The Sharp ratio is performance ratio that shows how a stock’s return above the risk-free stands in relation to the stock’s 
volatility. Assuming an industry has increased risk due to the enforcement of the CDP, in order for them to maintain the same 
sharp ratio, they would have to increase their expected return. In concentrated markets, the competitive effect of the CDP 
might deliver this increase in expected return due to the benefits of competitive advantage, however in more competitive 
industries, it could be extremely difficult for corporations to increase their returns without criminal means.  
50 The Sharp ratio in other industries could be higher because investors believe that an industry is less criminal, however there 
is the possibility that the risk of criminal behavior is the same, it’s just the rate of detection that is lower.  
51 Benmelech and Bergman (2011) find an increased cost of debt for competitors since the collateral value of assets is reduced 
due to oversupply through fire sales of the bankrupt corporation. With a lower value of collateral assets, even secured debt 
becomes more costly.  
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SEO implies that the firm is issuing new shares and selling them to the market. With lower 
demand for a stock, the price per share is reduced and the firm must issue more shares to gain 
the capital that they wanted to raise. Moreover, through the increased perception in risk, 
creditors might require higher interest payments in exchange for their capital. On the other 
hand, investors might be more optimistic about the remaining industry after a CDP has been 
enforced. They could have elevated confidence in the competitors to put more weight on 
compliance in their operations and to avoid any scrutiny from enforcement agencies. How and 
if the CDP could have a consequence for companies to raise capital remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, I believe this effect to be an interesting topic for future research. 
5.2.2 Mandatory SEO, Method of Payment and Employees 
This thesis mainly focuses on collateral consequences of consumers and producers. 
Nevertheless, as I mentioned in section 3.1, employees are often considered to be a vital 
stakeholder that should not be discounted when estimating the fallout of harsh penalties 
(Atkinson, 2020; Hulpke, 2017). In this regard, Atkinson (2020) proposes a framework that 
critically reduces collateral consequences not only for employees but most major stakeholders: 
SEO as mandatory payment method.  
A firm generally has different option when deciding how to finance a penalty. If cash reserves 
are not abundant enough to pay the fine directly, a corporation can receive capital either by 
raising debt, selling assets or by issuing new equity. The shareholders of a firm in general 
would prefer issuing new debt or selling assets. First, debt issuance would not dilute the equity 
value of the corporation. Moreover, selling assets would decrease the value of debt and equity 
in the firm, however, equity holder would be still better off compared to a funding scenario 
through equity alone. By increasing the probability that creditors are paid back in full, selling 
assets transfers some extent of liability from equity holders to debt holders (Atkinson, 2020). 
Raising debt levels and selling assets increases the likelihood of financial distress (Andrade & 
Kaplan, 1998) and thus corporate bankruptcy, which could create the collateral consequences 
on employees and other stakeholders alike. Shareholder would also be harmed, yet they would 
still prefer the negative effects of increasing debt and selling assets and the increased risk of 
bankruptcy to the negative effects of equity issuance (Atkinson, 2020). 
An equity issuance through a SEO could raise capital to pay a penalty in exchange for issuing 
new shares. With an increased number of total shares, the value of each share is lower, and the 
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holdings of the initial investors are diluted. This payment method would therefore certainly 
harm the firm’s investors, but debt, assets, and solvency would stay the same, as well as 
employment. Hence a SEO would minimize the risk of corporate bankruptcy and could avoid 
the collateral consequences on most stakeholders.  
Although fines that would be higher than the market capitalization of a company could still be 
too much to handle and result in bankruptcy, Atkinson (2020) provides crucial insight to the 
enforcement of the benchmark penalty. As long as the benchmark penalty can be paid with a 
SEO, governments could enforce it without fearing the collateral consequences that arise with 
the CDP, all the while maintaining optimal deterrence. A firm’s shareholders would need to 
bear the costs, however, they remain compensated for the degree risk they take. Overall, 
Atkinson (2020) provides interesting new research and ideas to reform corporate liability as 
we use it today.  
5.2.3 Impartiality 
The analysis of our case sample suggests that not all benchmark penalties would be enforced 
by governments. One aspect that I have yet to address is the impartiality of this type of 
corporate punishment (Hulpke, 2017).  
Out of 12 cases that are relevant and applicable for the benchmark penalty, two to three could 
have been appropriate to enforce by governments. For the remaining cases, Governments 
could have intervened to lower the benchmark penalty, in order to avoid corporate bankruptcy 
and the collateral consequences for producers or consumers or because they are averse to the 
uncertainty that they bring.  
This provides an important insight for the entire economic industry. The punishment is not 
equal for everybody. In a country with more weight on consumers, like Germany, harsh 
penalties that risk the CDP could categorically be refrained from in concentrated markets. As 
a result, large companies, who often have market power and operate in more concentrated 
industries, are benefitting from preferred treatment. The lack of real threats of harsh penalties 
for these companies could result in trivial deterrence and increased corporate crime. In 
contrast, small firms in competitive markets could still be subjected to the CDP. Although the 
discussed framework certainly provides some degree of deterrence in competitive markets, 
where Germany could find enforcing the benchmark penalty appropriate, it is not impartial 
that some corporations can benefit from this unequal treatment. According to German 
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legislation, all natural persons are equal under law52. It would be questionable if this concept 
is not transferred to legal persons.  
In rather producer focused countries, like the United Kingdom, debt levels could similarly 
stimulate unjustified advantages for some industries. When debt levels are very high, the 
government would rather not engage in harsh sanctions as the contagion effect could be 
severely damaging for the remaining producers. This framework would especially benefit 
industries that can afford high leverage levels. If the nature of the industry creates very 
consistent income, debt levels can be extended as the risk of missing interest payments is 
minimized. As a result, certain industries can create “debt shields”, that could disincentivize 
governments to act and prosecute diligently.  
Ultimately, we can see that the framework would not be impartial. Including alternative 
policies might provide some solutions, like the Atkinson (2020) proposal of a mandatory SEO 
payment. While this would certainly limit the impartial treatment, as the CDP would not be 
risked in as many cases, it would still not solve the issue entirely. As mentioned previously, if 
the benchmark penalty is higher than the market capitalisation of a corporation, then the threat 
of the CDP still exists, and governments would still make impartial decision in regard for what 
they think is best for society.  
5.2.4 Limitations 
The conclusions in this study are based on a relatively small case sample. Limited transparency 
in case proceedings remains an issue, which makes collecting larger samples a difficult 
undertaking. This limits our ability to go beyond potentially circumstantial correlations and 
towards significant causal relationships.  
Moreover, this thesis is based on the condition that the benchmark penalty can induce 
corporate bankruptcy. While this is certainly true for some cases, in others the likelihood that 
the fines would be so high that they impose a CDP is arguably extremely low. In practice, for 
fines to be threating corporate bankruptcy the nature of the crime and the generated harm 
should also be considered to keep a certain level of proportionality. A further distinction 
between benchmark penalties that are so severe that they induce corporate bankruptcy, and 
 
52 See § 3, paragraph 1, German constitution 
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benchmark penalties that are the maximum fine appropriate for the given crime but certainly 
not high enough to allow for extreme collateral consequences, would have been valuable for 
this analysis. However, the main implication of this thesis remains: the harshest sanction 
should be reserved for non-complying firms and these sanctions generally are the ones that 
can create sanction-induced bankruptcy. 
Ultimately, I use consumer and producer emphasis as an indicator for a government’s 
willingness to enforce benchmark penalties. However, this emphasis may not always be as 
clear and easily estimated with one variable alone. Using a larger range of proxies could help 
to more robustly classify the consumer vs. producer emphasis. However, finding an 
appropriate set of proxies to characterize this emphasis, while being unaffected by other 
political aspects or governmental ideologies, remains challenging. 
For example, employer social security tax rates could be a prime proxy candidate. Under 
comparatively lower social security taxes, corporations could employ each worker for fewer 
costs, thus having more money available for new hires or higher wages. On the other hand, 
additional profits could also be spent as dividends for shareholders. As in the case of corporate 
tax rates, whether governments choose lower versus higher social security tax rates for the 
benefit of society could depend on whether governments assume that producers would actually 
use the excess profits to benefit broader parts of society, or rather just to benefit their 
shareholders. Hence comparatively higher social security taxes could indicate that 
governments rather raise the money on societal benefits themselves, instead of letting 
producers act independently. 
As for mean corporate tax rates, I define lower social security tax rates as a proxy for more 
producer emphasis, and vice versa higher rates for consumer emphasis53. However, following 
this classification leads to substantially different results compared to the corporate tax rate 
classification (Table A 7). Only the characterization of the United Kingdom remains 
unchanged under the different proxies. The governments previously categorized as having 
consumer emphasis - Germany, Netherlands and Norway - have all now producer emphasis. 
Moreover, Sweden, previously characterized as having producer emphasis, is now classified 
as having consumer emphasis. These findings highlight again the problems with identifying 
 
53 Data of employer social security tax rate is provided by KPMG (2020b) 
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robust proxies, indicating that, possibly, either corporate tax rates, social security tax rates, or 
both, are not reliable estimators of governmental ideologies. 
In addition, producer vs. consumer emphasis is not necessarily the sole motivation driving 
governments to change their corporate or social security tax rates, nor to enforce or not enforce 
corporate liability. Other criteria may be also at play, and these new criteria must not 
necessarily directly relate to prices for consumers or corporate profits. For example, British 
prime minister Tony Blair intervened to stop the investigation of the firm BAE systems for 
paying bribes to Saudi Arabian princes in exchange for arms contracts. Allegedly, Blair was 
also concerned of severing the British-Saudi Arabian diplomatic tie if the investigation were 
to proceed. This would have halted the flow of intelligence about certain terrorist groups that 
Saudi Arabia provided, which ultimately could endanger British security (Leigh & Evans, 
2007). While this case could have occurred under a rare array of circumstances, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that governments could be indeed influenced by motivations beyond producer 
and consumer consequences. 
5.3 The Bottomline of the CDP and Policy Implications 
In this thesis, I analysed the relevant conditions to risk the CDP through the benchmark penalty 
and consider the circumstances where the CDP would have been appropriate to use. From the 
original 50 cases, the benchmark penalty would have been relevant and appropriate to enforce 
in two to three cases. In the remaining cases, the CDP is either not relevant to use or the 
consequences for society would have been too harsh for the ruling government to suffer.  
This gives an important insight: the optimal corporate liability framework might be difficult 
to implement. The CDP is not an impossibly inappropriate tool, as there are instances where 
government agencies could face the risk of enforcing maximum penalties and endure any 
bankruptcy fallouts. In these cases, it would be vital that enforcement agencies do not back 
away, as the CDP is not only relevant but also appropriate to risk from a government’s 
perspective. However, these cases are rare and overshadowed by the instances a government 
would have not risked the bankruptcy of a firm.  
Some industries and specific corporations can have significant advantages by operating with 
different debt levels or in distinctive competitive conditions. Since the benchmark penalty is 
limited by a government’s incentive of keeping certain collateral harm at bay, some industries 
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can evade harsh sanctions and optimal fines are not met. As a result of the difficulties of 
reliable enforcing benchmark penalties, the twofold incentive of optimal corporate liability 
does not work for every case. Without the certainty of the threat of harsh sanctions, deterrence 
is undermined, and compliance efforts reduced.  
In this regard, it seems that the punishment of corporations remains a problem. In practice, 
governments are pushing for NTR to enforce corporate liability. However, supranational 
binding guidelines that are consistent with the optimal framework for deterrence are yet to be 
established. Moreover, how can governments effectively combat corporate crime, if they 
cannot regularly rely on enforcing harsh sanctions that could risk the CDP, for extremely 
harmful crimes and for corporations that have not complied? For example, Germany is on the 
verge of introducing a new law for corporate liability. This law would increase the maximum 
fines for large firms, but they would still be kept limited to a certain threshold (Behr & Haas, 
2020). This restriction in corporate punishment would on the one hand minimize the risk of 
the CDP as a side effect of harsh fines, but it does not solve the difficulty of creating a powerful 
deterrent for the most harmful crimes.  
From this insight, I deduct two policy implications. First, I suggest to assess the option 
recommended by Atkinson (2020) of mandatory SEO payments. As long as the benchmark 
penalty is below the total market capitalization of the firm, mandatory SEO could always be 
enforced without risking severe collateral damages. This could create opportunities for 
Enforcement Agencies to devise a powerful and also believable threat of sanctions, even for 
firms that were originally exempted from harsh penalties that could risk bankruptcy. 
Mandatory SEOs would also only hit the stakeholders with decisive influence: the owners. In 
order to avoid any diluting of their investments, shareholders could be increasingly motivated 
to step in more actively and make sure that proper compliance and cooperation with authorities 
is established. However, the application of mandatory SEOs might be more difficult in 
practice. SEOs are only possible in public firms, and hence provide no solution in the private 
sector. They also present a critical infringement in the freedom of corporate governance and 
financing decision, which might be difficult to regulate. Moreover, optimal fines could be 
higher than the market capitalization of a corporations, which could then again risk the CDP 
and induce suboptimal deterrence and compliance levels. Nevertheless, embracing new ideas 
to solve the corporate punishment dilemma could be a potential remedy.  
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As a second policy recommendation, I argue that individual liability must be extended. 
Corporate liability will remain vital to achieve maximum deterrence, however, its reach is 
limited and would often favour certain companies and industries. In such cases, the culpable 
individuals need to be put to justice. As it was established at the beginning of this thesis, 
corporations do not commit crimes, but the persons behind the firm do. In industries, where 
corporations are feeling secure from the threat of corporate liability, because they are too 
important to fail, and employees do not fear prosecution, individual liability must be rigorously 
enforced in order to create the deterrence levels that are needed54. This is especially important 
in cases where the benchmark penalty cannot be enforced, as intense investigations on 
individuals could counteract the perception of feeble enforcement agencies that is created by 
limited corporate punishments. For example, establishing an organisation whose primarily 
focus is to investigate culpable individuals in corporations that are not applicable for the 
benchmark penalty, could provide an increase in individual prosecutions55. 
Still, it is crucial to acknowledge the limitations of individual liability. Gathering sufficient 
evidence to proof guilt remains an obstacle for enforcement agencies, and corporations also 
could present scapegoats, while simultaneously protecting other involved employees from 
prosecutions. All culpable individuals should be put to justice and not just the few employees 
who take all the blame, as otherwise crime would still be beneficial for most individuals. 
Achieving this goal will be challenging for enforcement agencies, since even identifying 
culpable employees in complex business transactions without the help of the firm remains 
difficult, but it could provide a crucial turning point for corporate crime deterrence.   
Apart from the policy recommendations, I deduct that harsh fines that can risk the CDP 
remains an unreliable tool for crime deterrence. However, there are instances when a 
government could find the risk of sanction-induced bankruptcy appropriate. In these cases 
where the CDP can be enforced, other factors could also play a role to promote corporate 
compliance, like the availability bias. This bias finds that deterrence is decreasing over time, 
as potential violators are forgetting about historic punishments for corporate crime. In this 
 
54 From 1999 to 2018, 74 % of all sanctions against natural person for foreign bribery were enforced in Germany and the US, 
while 27 member countries had each only a share of less than 1% (OECD, 2019a).  
55 Similar groups already exist in a different context. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act introduced the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, which monitors the financial stability of firms that are deemed too important for the U.S. economy to fail.  
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regard, even one CDP could attract great memorable public attention, which could create a 
short-term boost of compliance and deterrence. With this insight, even unique and inconsistent 
enforcements of the CDP through the benchmark penalty could give a powerful warning for 
some corporations.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I describe the most effective corporate liability framework for optimal crime 
deterrence. The foremost crucial piece in this framework is the dilemma between the social 
benefits of optimal deterrence on one side, and the societal harm from fines so harsh that they 
lead to corporate bankruptcy on the other. I evaluate whether the harshest corporate fine, the 
benchmark penalty, is relevant and appropriate to enforce. The relevance of this penalty is 
defined from the crime deterrence perspective, according to the firms compliant, versus non-
compliant behaviour. In contrast, the appropriateness of the penalty is defined from the 
government's perspective, according to the collateral consequences of this penalty on different 
stakeholder groups and how the government regards them. 
I present a framework in which the benchmark penalty is considered relevant by enforcement 
agencies in the case that firms do not self-report their crime, do not fully cooperate, and the 
crime is committed systematically, by more than one rogue employee. By using a data sample 
of 50 completed enforcement cases, 38 of which present sufficient information for my 
analysis, I find that the benchmark penalty could have been enforced in 16 cases from a 
deterrence standpoint. From these 16 cases, only 12 present sufficient information to 
determine whether the use of the CDP would be appropriate from a government's perspective. 
11 out of these 12 cases occur in concentrated markets, implying consumers are the main group 
affected by the consequences of the CDP. On the other hand, the remaining producers benefit 
in seven of the cases due to increased market power and are harmed in one of the cases due to 
reputational and other spill-over repercussions; while in the remaining four cases this analysis 
is not sufficient to discern whether producers are benefited or harmed by the CDP. 
By examining to which extent governments put emphasis on either consumers or producers, I 
estimate whether a government could consider the CDP as an appropriate risk and enforce the 
benchmark penalty depending on how much the favoured groups are damaged by it. This 
analysis indicates that in no more than three out of 12 cases would governments find the 
enforcement of the benchmark penalty, and its associated risk of corporate bankruptcy, 
appropriate. 
My findings highlight the impediments that the current status quo of corporate liability 
presents for crime deterrence. Although the theory on the optimal liability framework is well 
established, these results demonstrate the unfeasibility of the reliable enforcement of harsh 
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penalties that could lead to corporate bankruptcy. Currently, it is a government's prerogative 
whether to actually allow harsh penalties, and they can use this prerogative to favour their 
preferred groups. This behaviour lessens the threat of prosecution for certain firms and 
industries, which in turn hinders crime deterrence. 
Therefore, I propose an extension of this framework by extending prosecution and 
investigative efforts on individuals, who are after all the main culprits. Furthermore, promoting 
SEOs as the mandatory payment method for corporate fines could provide a potential remedy 
to the current deterrence predicament. SEOs can limit the financial impact of sanctions and 
decrease the risk of the CDP and its associated collateral consequences to stakeholders.  
Currently, the CDP is an uncertain threat, one that most governments tend to avoid. However, 
I also demonstrate that there are instances where the CDP could be classified as a relevant and 
appropriate risk. Due to potential government biases to favour preferred stakeholder groups, I 
argue that the CDP is not a reliable strategy to combat inadequate crime deterrence; yet in the 
rare cases where its use is both relevant and appropriate, corporate death might be the wake-
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Table A 1: Cases and deterrence-based variables 
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Table A 1 continued 
Table A 1 shows the 50 completed enforcement cases and the deterrence based variables. If all variables are met, the 
benchmark penalty could be enforced from a deterrence standpoint. If even one variable is not met, the benchmark penalty is 
not relevant. 
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Table A 2:Consequences on consumers and producers 
Table A 2 covers the CDP-relevant cases and depicts leverage levels and the degree of market competiton. It also shows 
whether consumers or producers would be harmed in the CDP-relevant cases. 
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Table A 3 presents the debt to capital ratios from the CDP-relevant industries.The Leverage is considered high, when the debt to 
capital ratio of a specific industry is above the total market debt ratio. 
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Table A 4: Corporate tax rate over time in OECD member states 
Table A 4 shows the corporate tax rate over time in OECD member states. Countries with a tax rate higher than the 
OECD median are classified as consumer emphasized (C), while the remaing are categorized as producer (P) focused.  
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Table A 5: CDP appropriateness and government emphasis for mean 
corporate tax rate 
Table A 5 shows if government could have find the CDP appropriate, bsaed on their emphasis on either consumers (C) or 
producers (P) and if the emphasized stakeholder group is affected by the CDP. The emphasis is derived via mean corporate tax 
rates. The «~» symbol indicates that the result is ambigous.  
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Table A 6: CDP appropriateness and government emphasis for yearly 
corporate tax rate 
Table A 6 shows if government could have find the CDP appropriate, bsaed on their emphasis on either consumers (C) or 
producers (P) and if the emphasized stakeholder group is affected by the CDP. The emphasis is derived via the corporate 
tax rates in the specific year a case was enforced. The «~» symbol indicates that the result is unclear.  
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Table A 7: Employer social security tax rate over time in OECD member states  
 
Table A 7 shows the employer social secrutiy tax rate over time in OECD member states. Countries with a tax rate 
higher than the OECD median are classified as consumer emphasized (C), while the remaing are categorized as 
producer (P) focused.  
 72
Table A 8:Sources for analysis 
 
Case Sources 
British Airways (2012) 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9cd978c9-83e5-49a3-a87d-6511170f4679 
Galvanised steel tanks (2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-water-tank-firms-over-27-million 
  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58db91e440f0b606e3000046/ce-9691-12-main-cartel-decision.pdf 
Standard Bank (2014) https://www.mortgagefinancegazette.com/market-news/fraud/standard-bank-fined-7-6m-for-failures-in-its-anti-money-laundering-controls-23-01-2014/ 
  https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/standard-bank-plc-fined-%C2%A376m-failures-its-anti-money-laundering-controls 
Deutsche Bank (2017) https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-deutsche-bank-163-million-anti-money-laundering-controls-failure 
Standard Chartered Bank (2019) https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-standard-chartered-bank-102-2-million-poor-aml-controls 
  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/09/standard-chartered-fined-money-laundering-sanctions-breaches 
Standard Bank (2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/30/standard-bank-fine-defer-prosecution-tanzania-bribery-scandal 
  https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/11/30/sfo-agrees-first-uk-dpa-with-standard-bank/ 
Rolls Royce case https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/22/campaigners-condemn-closure-of-rolls-royce-bribery-inquiry 
  https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/01/17/sfo-completes-497-25m-deferred-prosecution-agreement-rolls-royce-plc/ 
  https://www.bbc.com/news/business-38644114 
Smith & Ouzman Ltd. (2014) https://www.printweek.com/news/article/smith-ouzman-fined-2-2m-following-corruption-verdict 
  https://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/01/smith--ouzman-ltd-first-corporate-convicted-for-overseas-bribery-to-pay-22m 
XYZ/Sarclad case (2016) https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/sarclad-ltd/ 
  https://fulcrumchambers.com/sfo-suffers-further-blow-as-sarclad-ltd-dpa-revealed/ 
Beer price fixing(2015-2016) https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2016/B10-20-15.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 
  https://www.thelocal.de/20160510/supermarkets-fined-millions-in-beer-price-fixing-scandal 
Candy price fixing (2015) https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2017/B10-40-14.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
Asphalt manufacture price fixing (2018) https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2019/B1-189-18_B1-11-15.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 
SodaStream abuse of dominant position (2015) https://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/german-federal-cartel-office-fines-sodastream-for-continuous-dominance-abuse-20150122 
ZEG bicycle wholesaler (2018) https://www.bike-eu.com/home/nieuws/2019/01/zeg-to-pay-millions-in-fines-for-price-fixing-10135240?io_source=www.google.com 
  https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/germany-fine-imposed-on-bicycle-wholesaler-zeg-for-vertical-price-fixing/ 
Siemens resolution (2008) https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/publications/siemens-to-pay-16-billion-in-global-bribery-investigation/ 
  https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2008/12/siemens-settles-largest-ever-fcpa-enforcement-acti 
Airbus Defence and Space GmbH (2018) https://www.justiz.bayern.de/gerichte-und-behoerden/staatsanwaltschaft/muenchen-1/presse/2018/02.php 
  https://www.complianceweek.com/airbus-to-pay-8125-million-to-end-german-corruption-probe/8762.article 
MAN Ferrostaal (2011) n.a. 
DB Schenker (2016) https://www.cargoforwarder.eu/2016/11/06/db-schenker-convicted-of-bribery/ 
No identity Case Bav 2011/2 n.a. 
Atlas Elektronik (2017) https://www.mondaq.com/white-collar-crime-anti-corruption-fraud/613258/atlas-elektronik-settles-bribery-case-and-afm-imposes-administrative-fine-on-ics 
  http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Germany-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf 
Concrete cartel case (2015) https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/15720_vertaling-engels-besluit-prefab-garages-openbare-versie.pdf, see pages after 75 
  https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/15720_vertaling-engels-besluit-prefab-garages-openbare-versie.pdf 
Vinegar cartel (2015) https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/14615/ACM-fines-natural-vinegar-manufacturers-for-cartel-agreements 
  https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2015/08/13/Cartel-bust-for-vinegar-firms 
Dutch Railways NS (2017) http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2019/07/09/abuse-of-dominance-fine-of-e-41-million-for-dutch-railway-operator-annulled/ 
  https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2017/july/acm-fines-dutch-rail-operator-ns-for-an-alleged-abuse-of-dominance 
  https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/17397/Dutch-Railways-NS-abused-its-dominant-position-in-regional-tender-process 
Forklift truck batteries https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/17434/Fines-for-price-fixing-agreements-involving-forklift-truck-batteries 
ING Groep NV (2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ing-groep-settlement-money-laundering-idUSKCN1LK0PE 
  
https://www.ing.com/Newsroom/News/Press-releases/ING-reaches-settlement-agreement-with-Dutch-authorities-on-regulatory-issues-in-the-ING-Netherlands-business.htm 
No identity (2018) n.a. 
Ballast Nedam case (2012) https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Resolving-foreign-bribery-cases-with-non-trial-resolutions.pdf 
Telia case (2017) https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/telia-agrees-to-pay-1-billion-in-penalties-in-uzbek-corruption-scandal-settlement/ 
   https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/09/21/internationale-strijd-tegen-corruptie-telia-company-betaalt-nederland-274.000.000-us-dollar 
VimpelCom case (2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-seeks-to-seize-1-billion-in-telecom-probe-1439497898 
  https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2016/02/18/vimpelcom-betaalt-bijna-400-miljoen-dollar-aan-nederland-voor-omkoping-in-oezbekistan 
  https://www.ft.com/content/e5f63772-d693-11e5-8887-98e7feb46f27 
SBM Offshore case (2014) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sbm-offshore-nv-and-united-states-based-subsidiary-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-case 
  https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2014/11/12/sbm-offshore-n.v.-betaalt-ususd-240.000.000-wegens-omkoping 
Svenska Förpacknings- och Tidningsinsamlingen AB (2018) n.a. 
Ragn-Sells AB and Bilfrakt Bothnia AB (2016) https://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/fines-for-unlawful-collusion-on-waste-collection-in-vasterbotten/ 
  https://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/konkurrens/avgiftsforelaggande/14-0184-beslut-avgiftsforelaggande-bilfrakt--2016-11-09.pdf 
D¨ackia/Euromaster (2014) https://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/tire-service-chains-ordered-to-pay-fines-for-illegal-joint-tendering/ 
TeliaSonera case (2013) https://celec.info/the-market-court-ruling-the-price-squeezing-case-teliasonera-ab-v-konkurrensverket-md-20135/ 
  http://avgoranden.domstol.se/Files/MD_Public/Avgoranden/Domar/Dom2013-5.pdf 
Scandorama AB and O¨ lvemarks Holiday AB (2012) https://www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=4600 
Asphalt cartel (2009) https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/may-2009/The-Swedish-Market-Court-ends 
Nordea decision (2015) https://www.nordea.com/en/press-and-news/news-and-press-releases/press-releases/2015/2015-05-19-comment-on-the-sfsas-decision-of-18-may-2015.html 
  https://fi.se/contentassets/97ef5372bd4a4397bb5c4247ef206757/nordea_13-1784.pdf 
Handelsbanken decision (2015) https://www.fi.se/en/published/press-releases/2015/handelsbanken-receives-a-remark-and-is-ordered-to-pay-35-million/ 
  https://fi.se/contentassets/af45afe90062468c87c1bb6b46cf791c/handelsbanken_13-1783.pdf 
Bravur and Dynamic Sailing (2016) n.a. 
KEWB (2018) n.a. 
Gran & Ekran (2012) n.a. 
Telenor case (2018)       https://www.adeb.no/aktuelt/aktuelt/newsletter-the-norwegian-competition-tribunal-upholds-the-fine-of-nok-788-million-against-telenor-norge/ 
  https://norwaytoday.info/finance/telenor-must-pay-a-giant-fine-of-nok-788-million/ 
  https://konkurransetilsynet.no/788-millioner-i-gebyr-til-telenor/ 
El-proffen case(2017) https://konkurransetilsynet.no/favourable-ruling-in-el-proffen-case/?lang=en 
Santander (2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-moneylaunderingsanctions-idUSKCN1TX29B 
  https://www.finanstilsynet.no/contentassets/6ce0dd4e8e614aeeb1153fdb267636f4/vedtak-om-ileggelse-av-overtredelsesgebyr-santander-consumer-bank-as.pdf 
DNB case (2019) https://www.newsinenglish.no/2019/11/26/dnb-faces-multiple-investigations/ 
  https://www.finanstilsynet.no/contentassets/5c2e7c598a664be59e3197a9a320ced5/merknader-endelig-rapport-vedtak-om-overtredelsesgebyr-dnb-naringsmegling-as.pdf 
Koppang Landbruks- og Næringsmegling AS (2019) https://www.dataguidance.com/news/norway-finanstilsynet-imposes-infringement-fees-%E2%82%AC20000-koppang-landbruk-og-n%C3%A6ringsmegling-aml 
  https://www.finanstilsynet.no/contentassets/a46d8d7a67b146aab6fd4bbf0519d4e9/merknader-etter-stedlig-tilsyn-vedtak-om-overtredelsesgebyr-koppang-landbruk-og-naringsmegling-as.pdf 
Sædberg & Hodne AS (2019) https://www.dataguidance.com/news/norway-finanstilsynet-imposes-infringement-fees-%E2%82%AC20000-koppang-landbruk-og-n%C3%A6ringsmegling-aml 
  https://www.finanstilsynet.no/contentassets/a87b7886d0434fa4bc4435be66ac6248/merknader-endelig-rapport-vedtak-om-overtredelsesgebyr-naringsmegleren-sadberg-hodne-as.pdf 
Peab/Vannverk-saken (2008) n.a. 
Yara (2014) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yara-intl-corruption-idUSKBN13R0YF 
Store Norske (2011) n.a. 
Table A 7 shows the references used for the evalution of the deterrence based variables in section 4. 
